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PICTURING  TAKINGS
Lee Anne Fennell*
Takings doctrine, we are constantly reminded, is unclear to the point of
incoherence.  The task of finding our way through it has become more difficult,
and yet more interesting, with the Supreme Court’s recent, inconclusive foray
into the arena of judicial takings in Stop the Beach Renourishment.  Fol-
lowing guideposts in Kelo, Lingle, and earlier cases, this essay uses a series of
simple diagrams to examine how elements of takings jurisprudence fit together
with each other and with other limits on governmental action.  Visualizing
takings in this manner yields surprising lessons for judicial takings and for
takings law more generally.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stop the Beach Renourish-
ment1 intrigued and unsettled legal commentators by raising, but not
resolving, the question of judicial takings.2  Like Kelo3 before it, the
 2012 Lee Anne Fennell.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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1 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592 (2010).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 98–101 for an overview of the judicial tak- R
ings question and the Court’s decision in Stop the Beach.  A great deal of scholarship
and commentary has been produced on Stop the Beach during its short life, and many
more contributions are doubtless underway. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, The Com-
plexities of Judicial Takings, 45 RICH. L. REV. 903 (2011); Amnon Lehavi, Judicial Review
of Judicial Lawmaking, 96 MINN. L. REV. 520 (2011); Eduardo M. Pen˜alver & Lior Jacob
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case has prompted a resurgence of scholarly interest in takings.  And,
like the less famous but equally important Lingle v. Chevron,4 it impli-
cates core questions about the scope and bounds of the Takings
Clause.  Property scholars and students now face fresh challenges in
understanding how different elements of takings jurisprudence fit
together with each other and with other limitations on governmental
power.
In puzzling through this set of questions, I found myself turning
again and again to iterative graphical representations.  These pictures
soon became more than just a way to pin down what I thought I knew
about takings.  Rather, they turned into vehicles for asking new ques-
tions and for seeing aspects of the takings field—including, but not
limited to, the question of judicial takings—from new angles.  The
result was this essay, written around a series of simple diagrams. The
analysis proceeds in three steps.  Part I provides a visual primer on
(nonjudicial) takings law that lays the groundwork for what follows.
Part II introduces some puzzles about wrongs and remedies, again
sticking with legislative and administrative takings.  Part III examines
the implications of this analysis for judicial takings.
The diagrammatic approach pursued here illuminates three
underappreciated features of takings law that can help fit judicial tak-
ings into the existing doctrinal framework.  First, it draws attention to
the two distinct doctrinal boundaries implicated in takings law and
the ways that institutional competencies influence the strategies for
policing them.  Second, it emphasizes a category of confiscatory acts
that are not deemed to be takings.  Third, it highlights the fact that
traditional takings law slots governmental acts into three “zones”—
dubbed here the “free zone,” the “pay zone,” and the “no-go zone”—a
taxonomy that suggests a fourth possibility,5 and one that turns out to
Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305 (2012); Sympo-
sium, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Essay Reflections from Amici Curiae, 35 VT. L. REV.
413, 413–514 (2010); Symposium, Judicial Takings: Exploring the Boundaries of the Fifth
Amendment, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1–134 (2011); Symposium, Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Department of Environmental Protection, 61 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 203, 203–314 (2011); Symposium on Judicial Takings, 21 WIDENER L.J. 621,
621–888 (2012).  A classic article on judicial takings that long predates the current
academic flurry is Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449
(1990).
3 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
4 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
5 This follows from the famous four-rule taxonomy set out in Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115–18 (1972).  The way in which this taxonomy
maps onto eminent domain has been discussed in, for example, Carol M. Rose, The
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have interesting implications for judicial takings.  I show (without
endorsing) how these features could plausibly combine to render judi-
cial takings a nearly null set, occupying even less conceptual space
than the set of legislative or administrative takings that flunk the
Supreme Court’s public use test.
This is an essay about the architecture of takings doctrines and
the limiting principles built into their structure, not an effort to expli-
cate or advocate a new theory of takings, judicial or otherwise.  My
goal throughout is analytic rather than normative.  I start with takings
doctrines as they currently exist, try to find the best conceptual and
diagrammatic characterization of them, and then see where judicial
takings might fit into the story.
I. MAPPING (NONJUDICIAL) TAKINGS
Setting aside the enticing topic of judicial takings for the
moment, we can begin with takings doctrine as it has been applied to
actions emanating from the legislative and executive branches, which
I will refer to in this essay collectively as “nonjudicial” takings.
A. Three Zones
Our story starts simply enough.  There are some things that the
government6 can do, and other things it is prohibited from doing.
For now, we need not worry about why it cannot do the things it can-
not do, or how we can tell whether a given act lies inside or outside
the realm of legitimate government action.  We need only assume that
there are some fixed limits on government action.  That lets us define
an area within which the government may act if it so chooses, as
shown in Slide 1.
Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2180–81 (1997).  The three alternatives
outlined in the text suggest a fourth alternative in which the landowner pays the gov-
ernment not to take. See, e.g., James E. Krier, The Regulation Machine, 1 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 1, 23–25 (1982); infra Part III.C.
6 My focus in this Part is on governmental actors in the political branches.  Dif-
ferent actors within these branches will face different constraints on their actions; I
will reference these differences to the extent they become relevant to the analysis.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 4  7-JAN-13 9:10
60 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
SLIDE 1
We can then identify the surrounding space as the realm of
impermissible governmental acts.  Now we can start to think about
“takings.”  The Takings Clause in the U.S. Constitution reads: “nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”7  The category of “takings” includes exercises of eminent
domain (where the government admits it is engaging in a taking) as
well as certain other physical and regulatory incursions that are found
to rise to the level of a taking.8  The doctrines are complex, but the
universe of “takings” can nonetheless be represented by Slide 2’s sim-
ple square.
SLIDE 2
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Takings Clause is made applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Additionally, nearly
all state constitutions contain their own takings clauses. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
PROPERTY 1061 n.2 (7th ed. 2010).
8 See infra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. R
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Next, we must consider how this square of governmental takings
intersects with the respective realms of legitimate and impermissible
government actions depicted in Slide 1.  That relationship is illus-
trated in Slide 3.
SLIDE 3
As this intersection suggests, a governmental “taking” may or may
not be a legitimate governmental act.  In order for it to be legitimate,
two criteria must be met.  First, it must be for “public use.”9  Second, it
must ultimately be accompanied by “just compensation.”10  If both
these criteria are met, the taking falls within the realm of legitimate
government action.  This is represented by the overlapping area
shown in Slide 3.  Conversely, takings that fail to meet either the “pub-
lic use” or “just compensation” criteria would fall into the realm of
impermissible governmental acts represented by the portion of the
takings square that does not overlap with the oval of legitimacy.11
At this point, we can identify three functional zones in our pic-
ture.  First, there is a “free zone” (the part of the oval that does not
9 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause uses the term
“public use” to describe takings for which just compensation must be paid, but the
constitutional source of the public use requirement arguably lies elsewhere, in the Due
Process Clause. See infra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. R
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Regulatory takings will not initially be accompanied by
just compensation, but can still constitute legitimate governmental actions if ulti-
mately validated by the payment of just compensation.  Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (“The Fifth Amendment does not require that compensa-
tion precede the taking.”  (citation omitted)); see infra Part II.B.
11 The remedial approach used in this area effectively rules out the possibility
that acts will be found illegitimate due to the lack of just compensation alone, how-
ever.  Rather, courts transform otherwise valid but uncompensated takings into legiti-
mate ones by ordering just compensation for the period of the taking. See infra Part
II.B.
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overlap with the square).  In this area, which includes ordinary exer-
cises of the police power, the government can go about its business
without paying just compensation.12  Second, there is a “pay zone”
(the overlap between square and oval), where just compensation is
required.  Finally, there is a “no-go zone” (everything else, including
the non-overlapping portion of the takings square).13  Slide 4 shows
these zones, with the entire no-go zone, including the impermissible
portion of the takings square, rendered as black space.14
SLIDE 4
Note that, as represented here, the “pay zone” falls entirely within
the area of legitimate governmental action.15  To be sure, impermissi-
ble takings can occur (consider the non-overlapping part of the tak-
ings square) but these acts do not qualify for the liability rule regime
12 This zone is “free” in the sense that no cash compensation requirement is con-
stitutionally imposed.  This does not necessarily mean it is free of political costs—the
costs we’d expect governmental actors to attend to. See generally Daryl J. Levinson,
Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).
13 Following Calabresi and Melamed, there is a fourth logical possibility: that par-
ties can keep the government from acting by paying it not to do something.  Calabresi
& Melamed, supra note 5, at 1116–18.  This possibility has limited applicability in the R
case of nonjudicial takings, although it bears a family resemblance to the exactions
considered in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).  I will discuss below how a version of this fourth alterna-
tive may feature in judicial takings analysis. See infra Part III.C.
14 In some of the images that follow, the missing (impermissible) part of the tak-
ings square will reappear for expositional purposes, but these three basic zones
should be held in mind throughout the balance of the analysis.
15 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (describing an
inquiry into the validity of a governmental act as “logically prior to and distinct from
the question whether a regulation effects a taking, for the Takings Clause presup-
poses that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.”).
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established by the Takings Clause; the appropriate judicial response is
injunctive relief, not just compensation.16
B. In and Out of the Pay Zone
How does a governmental actor end up in the “pay zone” shown
in Slide 4?  There are two ways in: purposeful exercises of eminent
domain, and regulatory actions that are deemed by the court to be the
functional equivalent of eminent domain.  I will discuss each of these
paths into the pay zone before turning to some interesting territory
that lies outside that zone.
1. Eminent Domain
The first way into the pay zone is to consciously undertake a con-
demnation.  There is no question that exercises of eminent domain
are takings; the only question is whether the taking is for public use.
If so, it falls within the oval of legitimate governmental conduct.
Here, public use operates like a door that lets governmental entities
enter into the pay zone on purpose.
SLIDE 5
In other words, the Takings Clause establishes a liability rule
regime in which the government unilaterally accomplishes transfers
from private parties to itself upon the payment of just compensa-
tion—but only if the taking is for public use.  The gray squiggles sur-
16 Saying an act is a taking does not necessarily mean it is governed by the liability
rule regime established in the Takings Clause or that it violates the Takings Clause.
By its terms, the Takings Clause’s just compensation requirement only applies to a
subset of possible takings—those of private property for public use.  As discussed
below, impermissible takings are better understood as violations of constraints lying
outside the Takings Clause. See infra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. R
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rounding the door in Slide 5 represent this limiting principle; the
government must enter through the “public use” door in order to
qualify for the liability rule regime.  The Supreme Court has held that
this portal allows in all takings that are rationally related to a public
purpose.17  This standard gives a great deal of deference to govern-
mental determinations that a particular taking constitutes a public
use.  Nonetheless, the Court has warned that purely pretextual tak-
ings—ones that accomplish a naked transfer from private party A to
private party B, accompanied only by a thin and unconvincing excuse
for a public justification—would not satisfy the public use require-
ment.18  So the squiggles stay in the picture.
Significant controversy surrounds the size and the shape of the
public use door, and the way in which it is policed. Kelo sparked a
flurry of legislation to beef up the limits on public use beyond those
articulated by the Supreme Court.19  Some state supreme courts have
also read the takings clauses in their own state constitutions more
restrictively than the U.S. Supreme Court read the Takings Clause in
the U.S. Constitution.20  Thus, some jurisdictions have installed
tougher bouncers at the public use door.21
17 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487–89 (2005) (declining to
apply a “heightened form of review” in interpreting “public use”); id. at 490 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (observing that the public use standard the Court has long
applied “echoes the rational-basis test used to review economic regulation under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses”) (citations omitted); Haw. Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (“[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain
power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”).  Notably, however,
the Kelo majority does not repeat the rational basis standard of review, which could be
read as a toughening of the standard. See Thomas W. Merrill, Six Myths About Kelo, 20
PROB. & PROP. 19, 21 (2006); infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. R
18 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477 (“[I]t has long been accepted that the sovereign may
not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private
party B, even though A is paid just compensation.”).
19 See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to
Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009) (describing these reforms and questioning the
efficacy of many of them).
20 For example, in a case predating Kelo, the Michigan Supreme Court held that
takings that deliver property into private hands must fit within one of three specified
categories in order to qualify as public use.  County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765, 773 (Mich. 2004) (overruling Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)).
21 The effect of a stricter state public use standard on this analysis is discussed
below. See infra text accompanying notes 61–69.  These state limits resemble the ones R
set out by the U.S. Supreme Court insofar as “public use” is used to divide illegitimate
takings from permissible ones for which compensation must be paid.  A very different
meaning of “public use” would use the clause to filter from the class of permissible
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Regardless of the source and content of the requirements that act
to guard the door into the liability rule regime associated with emi-
nent domain, one thing is clear: the validity of a governmental act of
eminent domain depends upon the payment of just compensation.
While disputes may arise about the magnitude of this compensation,
governmental actors who exercise the power of eminent domain have
consciously chosen to enter the “pay zone.”  Like diners who enter a
restaurant for a meal, they expect to get a bill; they should not come
in if they are not willing to pay.
2. Regulatory Takings
There is another way into the pay zone.  Instead of affirmatively
exercising eminent domain, governmental actors may find themselves
in the pay zone when the ordinary work they were doing in the “free
zone” goes “too far.”22  A permanent physical occupation, even a triv-
ial one, always goes too far.23  Other regulatory actions that impact
property may or may not count as compensable takings.24  The notori-
takings those for which compensation must be paid. See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102
YALE L.J. 1077 (1993).  On Rubenfeld’s reading, other constitutional limits do the
work of separating permissible from impermissible governmental takings, leaving the
Public Use Clause to split up permissible takings between those that involve affirma-
tive “use” by the government (and hence require compensation on his account) and
those that do not involve such use (and hence would not require compensation on
his account). Id. at 1114–15.  Rubenfeld’s approach would avoid some textual
problems he flags with the Court’s reading of “public use,” including the fact that it
makes the language superfluous. See id. at 1079 (describing the current reading of
the “so-called ‘public-use requirement’” as “simply duplicative of the legitimate-state-
interest test that every deprivation of property must satisfy under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses”); see also infra Part II.A (examining the source of the public
use requirement).  His approach would also go some distance toward addressing the
linguistic awkwardness of the category I refer to below as “confiscatory nontakings” by
allowing for some “takings” to be both permissible and noncompensable. See infra
Part I.B.3; Rubenfeld, supra, at 1148–49.
22 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
23 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
Some caveats are discussed below, see infra Part I.B.3.
24 Those regulatory acts that remove all economically viable use from a property
and that are not justified by “background principles” will always be compensable tak-
ings.  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–31 (1992).  How-
ever, determining what counts as “all” presents challenges, as does the question of
what counts as “background principles.”  Although it stands for a per se rule, Lucas
does little to brighten the line between the pay zone and free zone.  The prevailing
framework for evaluating regulatory takings continues to be the one set out in Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  The Penn Central factors,
reiterated in Lingle, include “‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claim-
ant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
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ously ill-defined line dividing the free zone from the pay zone appears
in Slide 6 as a thick dashed line.
SLIDE 6
This way of landing in the pay zone differs in important ways
from the exercises of eminent domain discussed above.  In the case of
eminent domain, the act’s location within the square of takings was a
given, and the only question was whether it fell within the legitimate
portion of that square (the pay zone) by qualifying as a public use.
Where regulatory takings are at issue, the situation is reversed.  Here,
the regulatory takings analysis starts with the assumption that the gov-
ernmental act falls within the realm of legitimate governmental activ-
ity—the shaded oval.25  What is contested is the act’s location relative
to the line dividing compensable takings (the pay zone) from the
ordinary stuff of governance, which requires no compensation (the
free zone).  Where the condemning authority who exercises eminent
domain seeks the shelter of the pay zone to legitimate what is unques-
tionably a taking, the regulatory actor hopes to stay out of the pay
zone.
There is another difference as well.  The governmental entity
who enters the pay zone by crossing over from the free zone will not
have (yet) satisfied the just compensation requirement.  Unlike an
actor undertaking a conscious exercise of eminent domain, who will
expect (if not exactly welcome) the associated bill, governmental
investment-backed expectations” and the “character of the governmental action.”
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39 (2005) (quoting Penn Cent., 438
U.S. at 124).
25 Plaintiffs may well challenge the legitimacy of a governmental act (on any
number of grounds) and also argue that it is a regulatory taking.  The point in the text
is simply that an act only becomes a candidate for a regulatory taking if it is otherwise
legitimate. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
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actors who have inadvertently crossed over from the free zone may not
be expecting a bill at all.26  These actors can choose to pay just com-
pensation and go on regulating, or they can limit their financial expo-
sure by abandoning the acts that went too far.  In the latter case,
however, they still may be on the hook for compensation associated
with the time that the regulation was in force.27
3. Confiscatory Nontakings
As important as knowing how actors can land in the pay zone is
understanding how they stay out.  It might seem that certain confisca-
tory acts, like appropriating or destroying a home or business out-
right, would always fall within the core meaning of a “taking.”  But this
is not the case.  Instead, the law delineates a few categories of govern-
mental acts that will never constitute takings in the constitutional
sense, even when they involve the outright appropriation or destruc-
tion of private property.28  This seeming anomaly can be explained by
the idea that title is held subject to background principles that allow
such actions under specified conditions, so that nothing has really
been “taken.”29
The best known of the “never a taking” per se rules is the “nui-
sance exception.”  Actions directed at controlling common law nui-
sances are deemed not to be takings, even when they have devastating
effects on private property.30  However, the application of the nui-
sance exception is far from clear cut, and the exception ultimately
folds into the much-remarked difficulty locating the line between
compensable and noncompensable governmental acts.  Standard
applications of the nuisance exception involve regulatory acts rather
than outright confiscation or destruction, although the economic
26 Of course, the finding that an act constituted a regulatory taking is unlikely to
come as a complete surprise, and in some cases governmental entities may be fully
aware that an act runs a high risk of being found to be a compensable taking.
27 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1987); see infra Part II.B.2.
28 An excellent account of these categories, which has greatly informed this sec-
tion of the essay, is found in DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAK-
INGS 110–20 (2002).
29 See supra note 24; infra note 30. R
30 This exception, combined with other traditional exceptions to the Takings
Clause, evolved into the “background principles” exception articulated in Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).  The Lucas Court held that regulatory
actions that eliminate all economically viable use will always be takings, unless the
limitation in question “inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land owner-
ship.” Id. at 1029.
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effects may be similar.  Indeed, a nuisance-like rationale for the exer-
cise of eminent domain, such as “blight,” is not generally thought to
relieve governmental actors of the requirement that just compensa-
tion be paid if land is taken away permanently.31  This might often be
explained by the fact that the use in question does not, in fact, rise to
the level of a common law nuisance.32  But even where it plainly does,
the compensation requirement could still be justified by breaking the
governmental act into two temporally bounded components—nui-
sance abatement and affirmative use (or resale) of the land—and
exempting only the former from compensation.33  A more difficult
case is the demolition of property in the name of nuisance control
where the governmental actor does not take title to the property.34
Other per se exceptions permit confiscation or destruction with-
out compensation.  A representative example is the “conflagration
rule,” which holds that a public official fighting a raging fire may
destroy property without compensation in order to create a fire-
31 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) (holding, in a case involving
condemnation for redevelopment of a blighted area, that “[t]he rights of these prop-
erty owners are satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth
Amendment exacts as the price of the taking”).  It is true that the property that was
the subject of the challenge in Berman was not itself blighted (but lay within a blighted
area), id. at 31, but the Court gave no indication that the compensation requirement
would be altered for those structures that were in fact blighted.
32 Although the blight rationale is premised on the existence of a harmful or
subnormal use, that use may or may not qualify as a nuisance under the common law.
33 This point is clearer if we think first of the state regulating rather than confis-
cating.  In year one, it might order an owner to destroy a blighted housing unit on
(uncontroverted) nuisance grounds.  No compensation is required, because this is
nuisance control.  The owner complies, and thenceforth maintains the property in a
way that creates no nuisance.  In year two, the state cannot come back and demand
the owner destroy all improvements on the land simply because there used to be a
nuisance there.  Nor could it demand the owner hand over the property for free by
citing the past presence of a nuisance on the site.  Doing so would be pretextual; it
would go “too far.”  What the state cannot do in two steps, it should not be able to do
by blurring them together into one.
34 A recent Texas Supreme Court case addressed one facet of this issue in hold-
ing that “independent court review” is required by the Texas constitution when a
landowner appeals a nuisance determination made by an administrative agency to
support an uncompensated demolition. See City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562,
564 (Tex. 2012).  One might also argue that some efforts at nuisance control should
be compensable even if they do not amount to takings.  See Michael A. Heller & James
E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997,
1009–13 (1999) (presenting a category of compensable nontakings that would follow
from their approach of decoupling compensation choices from the determination of
whether a taking has occurred).
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break.35  Similarly, courts have held that no compensation is due
when police destroy property in the course of apprehending suspects
or protecting the public order36 or where property is destroyed in a
military emergency.37  Forfeitures of property that occur in accor-
dance with statutory and due process requirements are also exempted
from Takings Clause scrutiny.38  Property damage that occurs pursu-
ant to the federal government’s use of a navigational servitude has
35 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 28 at 118–20; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 n.16 R
(citing Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1880)) (discussing “litigation absolving
the State (or private parties) of liability for the destruction of ‘real and personal prop-
erty, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire’ or to forestall other
grave threats to the lives and property of others”); Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 73 (Cal.
1853) (“A house on fire, or those in its immediate vicinity which serve to communi-
cate the flames, becomes a nuisance, which it is lawful to abate, and the private rights
of the individual yield to the considerations of general convenience and the interests
of society.”).
36 See, e.g., Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1995) (hold-
ing no just compensation due when police caused severe damage to a convenience
store in order to apprehend a suspect).  The California Supreme Court found ample
support for its decision in “the so-called emergency exception to the just compensa-
tion requirement,” which it described as having “had a long and consistent history in
both state and federal courts.” Id. at 909.  Nonetheless, there has been some variation
in state court approaches to this issue, with a few jurisdictions showing a willingness to
find some law enforcement destructions to be takings. See, e.g., Wegner v. Milwaukee
Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991) (holding, based on the Minnesota consti-
tution’s takings provision, that “the better rule, in situations where an innocent third
party’s property is taken, damaged, or destroyed by the police in the course of appre-
hending a suspect, is for the municipality to compensate the innocent party for the
resulting damages”); Charles E. Cohen, Takings Analysis of Police Destruction of Innocent
Owners’ Property in the Course of Law Enforcement: The View from Five State Supreme Courts,
34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2002); Lior J. Strahilevitz, Case Note, When the Taking Itself is
Just Compensation, 107 YALE L.J. 1975 (1998).  The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
question in YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969), a case that held troops’ occupa-
tion of buildings that were under siege by rioters not to be a taking.  The YMCA Court
focused on the fact that the property owner was a “particular intended beneficiary” of
the act, a point that might be viewed as supporting compensation (under at least
some circumstances) for destruction undertaken for public benefit. Id. at 92. See
Strahilevitz, supra; Wallace v. City of Atlantic City, 608 A.2d 480 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1992).
37 See United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 153, 156 (1952) (holding that no
compensation was due when the Army “destroy[ed] property of strategic value to pre-
vent the enemy from using it to wage war the more successfully” ).
38 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 28, at 115–16; Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. R
442, 452 (1996) (holding that “government may not be required to compensate an
owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of gov-
ernmental authority other than the power of eminent domain”).  The use of the word
“already” in Bennis is interesting insofar as it suggests some logically antecedent stage
in which property claims are properly stripped from claimants before the issue of a
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been likewise deemed to be beyond the reach of the Takings Clause.39
It is debatable how well each of these per se exceptions holds up to
scrutiny, but a variety of interesting arguments have been put forward
on behalf of a number of them.40
Together, these doctrines mark out an area within the govern-
mental “free zone” that looks and feels a great deal like what a lay
person might call a taking, but which does not qualify for that label as
a doctrinal matter.41  We already know that a governmental decision
to appropriate property is not a necessary precondition to a finding of
a taking; regulatory bodies may end up in the pay zone without mean-
ing to do so.  The category of confiscatory nontakings outlined above
further establishes that a governmental decision to appropriate prop-
erty is not always sufficient to constitute a taking, either.  To show this,
Slide 7 overlays a triangle representing outright governmental appro-
priations on our three-zone model.42  Outright appropriations may be
impermissible acts,43 legitimate takings (conscious exercises of emi-
taking ever arises.  The notion bears some resemblance to the idea of background
principles articulated in Lucas. See supra note 25.
39 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 28, at 116–18. R
40 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333,
1344–48 (1991) (distinguishing compensable takings from tort-regulating govern-
mental interventions on the grounds that the former but not the latter involve sin-
gling out); Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 1114–15 (discussing governmental R
impoundments as noncompensable takings based on his reading of the public use
clause).
41 Taxation represents another type of governmental appropriation that has been
deemed to fall categorically outside the Takings Clause’s purview.  For discussion and
critique, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 283–305 (1985).
42 I use the term “outright” here rather than “intentional” to avoid some ambigui-
ties surrounding the notion of intent.  Presumably, the government is always engaging
in intentional (as opposed to somnambulant or coerced) acts, even if it hopes an act
will not lead to liability as a taking.  Yet focusing on intended outcomes introduces
possibilities like disingenuousness or fecklessness.  “Outright” speaks not to what an
actor actually intended but rather whether the actor has taken a decision that it would
publicly characterize as a confiscation or destruction of property. See infra note 46 R
and accompanying text.  Other work on judicial takings has used the notion of intent
in various ways to classify judicial acts. See generally Barros, supra note 2; Pen˜alver & R
Strahilevitz, supra note 2. R
43 Some governmental takings may flunk the conditions set out in the Takings
Clause without being outright appropriations.  For example, suppose that a regula-
tory action were undertaken for purely private benefit.  Depending on the extent of
the regulation, it might be considered a taking, but it would (more importantly) also
be a violation of the constitutional requirement that acts bear some rational relation-
ship to a conceivable public purpose.  Hence, it would fall into the “no go” portion of
the takings square, even if the governmental actor did not appropriate property out-
right.  The same can be said of regulatory acts that are ultra vires. See generally Mat-
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nent domain), or legitimate, noncompensable acts (such as property
forfeitures for criminal conduct).
SLIDE 7
C. Taking Stock
1. Two Contested Boundaries
As the analysis thus far has established, takings jurisprudence
grapples with two contested boundaries: 1) the line between takings
that are not for public use and those that are (“the public use line”);
and 2) the line between legitimate governmental acts that can be car-
ried out without paying compensation and legitimate governmental
acts that require compensation (“the regulatory takings line”). The
placement of the public use line determines the scope of eminent
domain, while the regulatory takings line determines the scope of reg-
ulatory takings.  Huge literatures address each of these boundaries,
and academics have debated a variety of procedures for determining
the location of these lines.  For our purposes, it is enough to note
their presence together in our takings picture, as shown in Slide 8.
thew D. Zinn, Note, Ultra Vires Takings, 97 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1998).  For this reason,
there is a corner of the impermissible portion of the takings square that is not
overlaid by Slide 7’s triangle of outright appropriations.
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SLIDE 8
Putting the two boundaries together in the same diagram high-
lights an important contrast that will become important to the later
analysis. The line defining the scope of regulatory takings—the
boundary between the free zone and the pay zone—is actively policed
by courts.44  In contrast, the line defining the scope of eminent
domain—the boundary between the no-go zone and the pay zone—is,
at least as far as the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence goes, largely self-
policed by the political actors engaged in condemnations.45  This dif-
ference can be chalked up to differences in institutional competence.
Courts view themselves as relatively good at telling when regulation
goes “too far” but less good at determining what does and does not
serve a public purpose.  Hence, they are willing to defer to legislative
and executive branch actors in the latter case, but not in the former.
2. Characterizations and Outcomes
The two boundaries just discussed relate to two different ways
that a governmental actor might characterize a given property-
impacting act.46 First, the actor might characterize the act as legiti-
44 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1449 (“Although the question of when a partic- R
ular legislative or executive action constitutes a ‘taking’ is relatively muddled, the
courts actively police the legislative and executive branches and, with growing fre-
quency, invalidate actions that have gone too far.”).
45 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (“For more than a
century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intru-
sive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what pub-
lic needs justify the use of the takings power.”).
46 I focus here on how the actor characterizes the act rather than what the actor
“intends,” recognizing that there may be instances when the two do not match.  It is
reasonable to assume that no actor will claim to be undertaking an act that is not for a
public purpose, but that does not mean that serving the public is always what the
actor truly “intends.”
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mate and noncompensable, part of her ordinary duties in adjusting
the benefits and burdens of life in a complex society.  Alternatively,
the actor might characterize the act as an outright appropriation of
some sort that is undertaken for public use.
A reviewing court may slot the act into any one of the three basic
zones delineated in Slide 4.  The act might be deemed not for a public
purpose at all, and hence be placed in the no-go zone; it might fall in
the free zone as an act that is for public use but is not a taking; or it
might be deemed a taking for public use for which just compensation
is required.
Table 1 shows the possible ways in which a governmental actor’s
characterization and the court’s holding intersect to produce legal
outcomes in takings cases.  The rows indicate the actor’s characteriza-
tion, and the columns indicate the zone in which the court ultimately
locates the act.
TABLE 1: OUTCOMES IN TAKINGS CASES
Court’s
Holding
Actor’s
Characterization
Not for Public Use
[No-Go Zone]
Not a Taking
(But Is for
Public Use)
[Free Zone]
Taking for 
Public Use
[Pay Zone]
Legitimate,
Noncompensable
Governmental Act
Outright
Appropriation
for Public Use
ordinary
exercise of the
police power
pretextual, invalid
A to B transfer
confiscatory
nontaking
impermissible act regulatory taking
eminent domain
Table 1’s top row gives us three alternative outcomes when a gov-
ernmental actor is not engaging in an outright appropriation.  These,
reading from left to right, are: 1) it will be found to be an impermissi-
ble act, outside the realm of legitimate government activity; 2) it will
be an ordinary exercise of the police power that is not compensable;
or 3) it will be found to be a regulatory taking for which just compen-
sation must be paid.  There are also three alternative outcomes when
the governmental actor understands itself to be engaging in an appro-
priation.  These (again left to right) are: 1) it will be found to be a
pretextual use of the eminent domain power, and hence invalid as a
naked A to B transfer; 2) it will be found to fit within an exception
such as the conflagration rule and thus treated as a confiscatory
nontaking for which no compensation is due; or 3) it will be found to
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be a legitimate exercise of the eminent domain power for which just
compensation must be paid.
Slide 9 locates Table 1’s four categories of legitimate governmen-
tal acts on the basic takings diagram.  Pretextual takings and other
impermissible acts are lumped together in the no-go zone.
SLIDE 9
II. WRONGS AND REMEDIES
With the basic terrain of takings jurisprudence in mind, we can
take on some complexities involving the boundaries depicted in Part
I—how they are policed, what crossing them means, and how identi-
fied wrongs are remedied.  As suggested above, takings of private
property are subject to two constitutional requirements: that the prop-
erty be taken for public use and that just compensation be paid.  I will
examine these requirements in turn, and then make some observa-
tions about how and by whom the two boundaries identified above—
the public use line, and the regulatory takings line—are policed.  In
working through this analysis, I will continue to focus (for now) on
nonjudicial takings.
A. Public Use
Consider first the public use requirement.  Suppose that a gov-
ernmental actor engages in an appropriation of private property that
fails this test, perhaps by authorizing a clearly pretextual transfer from
the actor’s enemy, A, to the actor’s friend, B.  Interestingly, this does
not violate the literal terms of the Takings Clause.47  The clause bans
taking private property for public use unless just compensation is
47 See Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir.
1988) (noting the Takings Clause’s “silence” on takings for private use); John D.
Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary is Different, 35 VT. L. REV.
475, 483 (2010)  (discussing the view that “the Takings Clause only applies to takings
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paid.  It does not, by its terms, have anything to say about taking pri-
vate property for private use, whether to settle a score, pain an enemy,
delight a friend, or accomplish any other purely private goal.  This is
not to say that takings for private use are constitutional.  But it sug-
gests we must look outside the Takings Clause to understand why.48
One possibility has received recent attention: a taking that fails the
public use test is a due process violation.49
This answer fits together neatly with the Supreme Court’s test for
public use. The test is whether the taking in question is rationally
related to a public purpose.50  This is a means-ends test.  In Lingle v.
Chevron, the Court made clear that means-ends tests have no place in
Takings Clause jurisprudence.  The focus in Lingle was on a more
demanding means-ends test that had been carelessly repeated in a
series of regulatory takings cases, but the point was stated quite
broadly.51  The best way of understanding the “public use” require-
for public use, and does not apply at all to actions that do not serve a public use” and
citing Coniston).
48 Courts and commentators have generally assumed that the public use require-
ment is a requirement of the Takings Clause, but the language is in tension with that
interpretation.  Judge Posner discusses this point at some length in Coniston:
It can be argued that if the taking is not for a public use, it is unconstitu-
tional, but perhaps not as a taking; for all the takings clause says is “nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”  This
language specifies a consequence if property is taken for a public use but is
silent on the consequences if property is taken for a private one.  Perhaps
the effect of this silence is to dump the case into the due process clause.
The taking would then be a deprivation of property without due process of
law.
Coniston, 844 F.2d at 464.  Posner goes on to detail a number of difficulties with this
interpretation, including its apparent inconsistency with some, but not all, prior state-
ments on the matter by the Supreme Court, before deciding that the matter need not
be decided in order to handle the case at hand. Id.
49 See Pen˜alver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 327 (“A better way to describe the R
situation of takings for private use is that they do not fall within the scope of the
State’s power to act at all and, for the same reason, violate due process.”); John Paul
Stevens, The Ninth Vote in the “Stop the Beach” Case, Transcript of Address at Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law, Oct. 3, 2012, at 16, available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_10-03-12.pdf (describing due pro-
cess protections as “the true source of the prohibition against takings for a purely
private purpose.”); see also Coniston, 844 F.2d at 464; Zinn, supra note 43, at 282–83 & R
n.193 (discussing and citing sources on the connections between public use and due
process).
50 See supra note 17. R
51 It is certainly possible to question the crispness of the distinction the Lingle
Court draws between the means-ends analysis that it associates with due process and
the Takings Clause’s concern with burden distribution. See infra note 87.  Nonethe- R
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ment in the Takings Clause, then, is as a prerequisite for qualifying for
the clause’s liability rule regime.52  When a taking does not qualify, it
simply does not fall within the Takings Clause at all, much less violate
it.53  Instead, it is better understood as violating substantive due
process.54
This analysis suggests that there is nothing special about the
impermissible portion of the takings square; it disappears into a gen-
eral prohibition on governmental actors undertaking acts that fail to
meet the requisite means-ends test.  Thus, it seems appropriate for
our purposes to depict impermissible takings as of a piece with all
other forms of prohibited governmental actions; they all fall within
the no-go zone first identified in Slide 4 above.  It is worth emphasiz-
ing here that governmental acts can be impermissible for a wide vari-
ety of reasons other than failing means-ends tests.  Further, different
means-ends tests apply in different contexts.55  I do not mean to sug-
gest that all of these ways of exceeding legitimate power are indistin-
guishable from each other for all purposes, only that takings that are
not for public use fall within a broader class of prohibited government
acts, rather than constituting a meaningfully unique category of their
own.
There remain a few wrinkles to work through.  One question is
whether the Supreme Court’s test for public use is identical to, or
more stringent than, the ordinary rational basis review that defines
the minimum standard for due process. Kelo indicates that the public
use requirement would not be met if the condemnor had an imper-
missible purpose of transferring property for purely private benefit.56
less, the public use test as stated by the Court is squarely positioned on the means-
ends side of the line.
52 See Coniston, 844 F.2d at 464 (“Rather than being viewed simply as a limitation
on governmental power the takings clause could be viewed as the source of a govern-
mental privilege: to take property for public use upon payment of the market value of
that property . . . .”); see also id. (describing the Supreme Court’s decision in Montana
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896) as follows: “once the privilege created by
the takings clause was stripped away, the state was exposed as having taken a person’s
property without due process of law”).
53 See Pen˜alver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 327. R
54 See id.  It might also violate other limits on governance contained in the Consti-
tution or in relevant statutory provisions.
55 Rational basis review is the default standard for economic and social legisla-
tion.  However, elevated scrutiny applies when suspect classifications or fundamental
rights are at issue.
56 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005) (“Nor would the City be
allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual
purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”).
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Some scholars have read this statement to mean that Kelo requires the
condemnor to be actually pursuing a public purpose.57  This would
indeed be a stronger requirement than the usual rational basis stan-
dard that requires only a conceivable public purpose.  But not having an
improper purpose is a different and easier requirement to meet than
actually having a proper purpose—and the former seems to be
already embedded in the usual rational basis analysis.58
Nonetheless, there are some indications in Kelo (both in Justice
Stevens’s opinion for the Court and in Justice Kennedy’s concur-
rence) that planning efforts may be relevant to the validity of eco-
nomic development takings.59  These suggestions might be read to
contemplate a somewhat more purposeful pursuit of the public inter-
est than is usually required by rational basis review—one that is consis-
tent with understanding public use as a door that a government actor
must open and enter by engaging the appropriate institutional appa-
ratus.  Yet, even if a somewhat stronger means-ends test were applied
as a matter of federal constitutional law, Lingle’s analysis still tells us it
would remain a due process standard and not a Takings Clause stan-
dard.60  As far as current federal constitutional law goes, then, there is
57 Pen˜alver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 322; see also Merrill, supra note 17, at 21 R
(quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478) (observing that “the decision appears to contemplate
that courts should carefully review condemnations that result in a private retransfer of
property, or are not carried out in accordance with some planning exercise, to deter-
mine whether the government is taking property ‘under the mere pretext of a public
purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit”).
58 Pen˜alver and Strahilevitz recognize this, characterizing any distinction between
the rational basis standard and the standard for public use as “more apparent than
real,” insofar as any legislation that is actually found to be motivated by an improper
purpose will be struck down on rational basis review.  Pen˜alver & Strahilevitz, supra
note 2, at 324–25 n.79 (citing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491). R
59 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 444
(2007) (referencing the “Court’s implicit suggestion [in Kelo] (made explicit by Jus-
tice Kennedy in concurrence) that public, participatory planning is a constitutional
safe harbor and may separate impermissible ‘private’ takings from presumptively valid
public ones”).
60 Lingle goes further, however, by rejecting the possibility of any elevated means-
ends analysis in the regulatory takings context (exactions cases aside).  The Court
cites prudential considerations for rejecting the “substantially advances” test that
would apply with equal force if the test were imported into the due process analysis.
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005) (explaining that “the ‘substan-
tially advances’ formula is not only doctrinally untenable as a takings test—its applica-
tion as such would also present serious practical difficulties” because “it would require
courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state and federal regulations—a task
for which courts are not well suited”).  Hence, Lingle not only evicts the medium-
tough “substantially advance a legitimate state interest” test from the Takings Clause
and exiles it to the land of due process, but also suggests its beefed-up formulation
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neither daylight nor overlap between a due process violation and a
taking that meets the public use requirement; a given condemnation
is either one or the other, never both, and never neither.
A trickier issue is presented by the heightened public use require-
ments that some states have imposed as a matter of statutory or state
constitutional law.61  Could these additional hurdles make a condem-
nation impermissible under state law (because it does not meet the
heightened state standard) while still leaving it in compliance with the
federal requirements for due process?  The key question is whether
state law constrains what counts as a legitimate state interest (or its
alter ego, “a public use”) for federal due process purposes.62  If so,
there would again be neither daylight nor overlap between a permissi-
ble taking (this time under state law) and a federal due process viola-
tion.  If not, we would run into the following interesting situation: that
one and the same act could land in the pay zone for federal law pur-
poses and in the no-go zone for state law purposes.63
Clearly, a state could not meaningfully apply stricter public use
limits than those in the U.S. Constitution (as Justice Stevens, writing
for the Court in Kelo, emphasized they could64) if governmental actors
could continue to access the “pay zone” regardless of what state law
says about it.  Hence, the violation of heightened state public use stan-
dards must be enjoinable.  In the typical eminent domain case, this
would mean no taking would occur at all, and hence there would be
nothing left to fall within the federal pay zone.  It would be logically
possible for a regulatory taking that failed to meet a heightened state
public use requirement to be enjoined and yet still be subject to a just
has no place at all in federal constitutional jurisprudence surrounding land use deci-
sions. See Lynn E. Blais, The Problem With Pretext, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 963, 982–983
(2011) (arguing that the Lingle Court’s “doctrinal fit” and “institutional legitimacy”
concerns “also dictate that the concern for pretext fall out of eminent domain
jurisprudence”).
61 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. R
62 This same question will return later in an even more interesting guise. See infra
Part III.A.1.
63 Cf. Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem of Judicial Tak-
ings, 6 DUKE J. CON. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 97 (2011) (stating that “even if the court’s
action is illegal under state law that does not mean that it cannot also qualify as a
taking under federal constitutional law”).  Although Somin discusses the situation
where state law is violated by a court, his logic would also apply with equal force to
nonjudicial actors who violate a state’s elevated public use requirement.
64 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (“We emphasize that
nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its
exercise of the takings power.”); Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question
for Richard Epstein, 44 TULSA L. REV. 751, 762–63 (2009) (lauding the federalism impli-
cations of the Supreme Court’s stance in Kelo).
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compensation requirement (for any interim period) under federal
law.65  But this seems out of keeping with the Supreme Court’s view of
the Takings Clause as a domain in which otherwise valid acts are evalu-
ated to determine if compensation is required.66
An answer more consonant with existing doctrine and principles
of federalism is that a taking that does not meet state public use
requirements can never truly be “for public use” for federal constitu-
tional purposes either, since it is an act that by all rights never should
have happened.67  The Supreme Court has treated ultra vires acts in
just this manner,68 and whether or not a given taking literally falls into
that category, the same reasoning arguably applies.69  Importing state
law to limit public use seems as appropriate, and as necessary, as
importing state law into the meaning of property itself.
65 I set aside here the procedural questions that might be associated with such
possibilities.
66 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005). Allowing fed-
eral compensation for interim takings that violate state public use requirements could
also introduce moral hazard concerns, if it delayed challenges on public use grounds
at the state level by those hoping to glean a large interim payment in addition to an
injunction.
67 To be sure, the Court has held in other contexts that a governmental actor
may violate state law without necessarily committing a federal constitutional violation.
See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (holding that an arrest that violates
state law did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1
(1944) (holding that there was no equal protection violation when a state election law
was violated).  But the issue here is distinct in that the very thing that legitimates the
act at the federal level is its pursuit of a public purpose, a term that is meaningless
without reference to the purposes a given state actor is empowered by its jurisdiction
to pursue.
68 See Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1910) (“The constitutional
prohibition against taking private property for public use without just compensation
is directed against the Government, and not against individual or public officers pro-
ceeding without the authority of legislative enactment.  The taking of private property
by an officer of the United States for public use, without being authorized, expressly
or by necessary implication, to do so by some act of Congress, is not the act of the
Government.”); see also Zinn, supra note 43, at 252–54 (discussing Hooe’s treatment of R
ultra vires actions).
69 The question of how to treat various kinds of governmental errors or excesses
under takings law has received some scholarly attention. See generally David W. Spohr,
“What Shall We Do With the Drunken Sailor?” The Intersection of the Takings Clause and the
Character, Merit, or Impropriety of Regulatory Action, 17 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL L.J. 1
(2008); Zinn, supra note 43; John D. Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 ALA. L. REV. R
1047 (2000). See also infra Part III.A.1 (discussing ultra vires acts in the context of
judicial takings).
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B. Just Compensation
Consider next the just compensation requirement.  Once a gov-
ernmental act qualifies as a taking for public use, just compensation
must be paid.  It might seem, then, that a taking for which a govern-
mental actor did not pay at all, or did not pay enough, would fall into
the impermissible realm as surely as would a taking that was not for
public use.  Certainly, courts regularly consider the possibility that the
Just Compensation Clause has been violated in just such ways.  But
thinking about where such a governmental act fits into our diagram
reveals an interesting wrinkle.
1. A Fine Fix
Otherwise legitimate governmental acts that amount to takings
are not relegated to the impermissible realm simply due to an actor’s
failure to voluntarily pay full just compensation.  The reason is simple:
whenever an uncompensated taking is otherwise legitimate (for public
use, and not in violation of any other limitation on governmental
action), courts force governmental bodies to pay just compensation
for as long as the taking continues.70  The remedy for violation of the
Just Compensation Clause is nothing less than mandatory compliance
with that clause.  In other words, one need not pay in advance, or pay
willingly, to end up in the “pay zone.”  One merely needs to do other-
wise legitimate acts for which compensation is due.  The zone, then, is
best understood not as an “already paid” or “willingly paid” zone, but
rather as a “must pay zone.”
Paying just compensation transforms what otherwise would have
been an impermissible governmental act into a permissible one under
the Takings Clause, even if the governmental entity did not initially
offer to make the payment.  Even if the government chooses to dis-
continue the act that is found to be a taking, it still must pay just com-
pensation for the time period that the taking for public use was in
effect.71  Once just compensation is paid, the violation disappears and
is replaced by a legitimate governmental act that complies with the
Takings Clause.
In other words, there is an implicit doctrinal rule that any past or
ongoing taking that can be legitimated by just compensation must be
legitimated by just compensation—unless and until the government
70 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A.,
482 U.S. 304, 319 (1987) (requiring compensation when an ordinance has worked a
taking for a period of time prior to invalidation).
71 Id.
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stops doing it.72  Known cases of nonjudicial takings in which just
compensation has not been paid are addressed with a payment
requirement that has the interesting effect of validating the govern-
mental act ex post.
2. No Way Out
The flip side of the remedial point just made is that governmen-
tal actors may get stuck with an unexpected bill.  Once a governmen-
tal actor enters the pay zone, whether by exercising eminent domain
or by crossing a hazy line in the course of regulating, there is “no way
out” in the following sense: whatever has been taken must be paid for.
In the eminent domain context, this principle works in a straightfor-
ward way, subject only to disputes about the appropriate measure of
just compensation.73  In the context of regulatory takings, however,
things become more complex.  The governmental actor is not forced
to go on taking, and can give up the regulation in question in response
to the litigation outcome.  This does not pull the earlier action out of
the pay zone during the time it was in force, however; just compensa-
tion must still be paid for whatever is found to have been taken.74
Governmental bodies can thus respond to a finding of a regulatory
taking by keeping the regulation in place and paying just compensa-
tion for the full impact on the property, or withdrawing the regulation
and paying a prorated price for the interim period.75
72 Accordingly, those whose property has been taken by a governmental party
with the ability to pay are entitled to nothing more (and nothing less) than just com-
pensation. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984); see also  Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2617 (2010)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Ruckelshaus); infra Part III.D.2 (discussing the reme-
dial question in the judicial takings context).
73 Some states do, however, have what amounts to a liberal return policy in which
a condemnor confronted with the fiscal consequences of just compensation has the
choice to decide not to go through with the purchase after all. Stop the Beach, 130 S.
Ct. at 2613–14 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Even there, however, payments are
required to make up for the delay and dislocation associated with the condemnation.
Id.
74 First English, 482 U.S. at 321 (“[W]here the government’s activities have already
worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking
was effective.”).
75 Alternatively, the governmental actor may amend the regulation, again paying
for any interim taking. See id. (“Once a court determines that a taking has occurred,
the government retains the whole range of options already available—amendment of
the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent
domain.”).  Significantly, the fact that governmental actors who are found to have
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The requirement that regulators who abandon their regulatory
takings must nonetheless pay just compensation for the interim
period was established in First English.76  That rule was not changed in
Tahoe-Sierra, a case that held there is no per se taking where a morato-
rium renders property valueless for a time.77  Squaring the two cases is
a conceptual challenge, and it is worth noting that not one Justice
signed onto both majority opinions.78  The tension between the cases
arises because First English holds that a governmental actor must pay
even if its taking (it turns out) only lasted for a while, whereas Tahoe-
Sierra suggests that rendering property valueless temporarily is not a
per se compensable taking.79  The fancy footwork required to square
the two cases focuses on whether something is, or is not, “really” a
taking, a question that seems to be answered from an ex ante perspec-
tive.  Thus, the fact that a taking ends does not keep it from having
been, during its short life, a taking for which compensation is due.80
This is true even if a similar regulation that was designed from the
outset to have a similar effect and duration would not be a compensa-
ble taking.81
committed takings have this range of choice does not mean that reviewing courts can
choose among these remedies at will.
76 Id. at 319 (“Where this burden [on the owner] results from governmental
action that amounted to a taking, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment requires that the government pay the landowner for the value of the use of the
land during this period.”).
77 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
78 Both cases were decided 6–3 less than fifteen years apart, but the Court exper-
ienced significant turnover in the interim.  Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the
majority opinion in First English, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell,
and Scalia.  Justice Stevens dissented, joined in part by Justices Blackmun and
O’Connor. First English, 482 U.S. 304.  In Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Stevens penned the
majority opinion, joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.  Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, along with Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302.
79 This does not mean, of course, that the temporary interference might not be a
taking under Penn Central.  Still, the Court’s refusal to apply a per se test suggests that
at least some regulations that temporarily remove all economically viable use will fail
to amount to takings.
80 First English, 482 U.S. at 319 (“Invalidation of the ordinance or its successor
ordinance after this period of time, though converting the taking into a ‘temporary’
one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation
Clause.”).
81 Such a regulation would be deemed “prospectively temporary” and hence sub-
ject to Tahoe-Sierra’s rule that Penn Central balancing applies. See ROBERT C. ELLICK-
SON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 264–65 (3d ed. 2005) (distinguishing
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The conceptual tension remains when we consider the just com-
pensation requirement.  If the assessment that an action “was” a tak-
ing is based on the whole thing having been taken, and if the smaller
time slice would not have been a taking on its own,82 then how does a
court arrive at the conclusion that the time slice (and only the time
slice) must be compensated for?  One explanation would be that the
government is actually required to, and does, compensate for the full
(permanent) taking, but does so only partly in cash.  The rest of the
compensation is provided in kind by relinquishing the regulation.83
The ability to pay for takings in kind is not open-ended, as the exac-
tions analysis in Nollan and Dolan establishes.84  But within this limited
context, recognizing an implicit in-kind payment may offer the clear-
est conceptual way of understanding what is going on.
C. The Inviolable Takings Clause?
The public use and just compensation analyses together suggest
that once a court finds a taking has occurred, it will classify the act in
one of two ways.  Either it will be deemed an impermissible act that
does not qualify for the Takings Clause’s liability rule regime at all, or
it will be an act which can, and hence must, be validated by the pay-
ment of just compensation for however long the taking continues.
Slide 10 shows how these observations map onto the diagrams devel-
oped above.
“retrospectively temporary” takings from “prospectively temporary” actions and citing
cases).
82 Of course, it is possible that a given time slice might be a taking on its own. See
supra note 79.  But if we assume that at least some time slices would not be takings on R
their own, the conundrum spelled out in the text would remain.
83 Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 195–215 (1985) (discussing “implicit in-kind R
compensation” as an alternative to cash payments in the regulatory takings context).
84 Nollan held that the government cannot exact concessions that would consti-
tute takings if appropriated outright as a condition of lifting regulations unless there
is an “essential nexus” between the reason for the original regulation and the conces-
sion requested.  Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
Dolan added a requirement of “rough proportionality” between the concession and
the problem to which the original regulation responded.  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 391 (1993).  Together, these cases appear to limit the ability of governments
to pay for what would otherwise be takings by offering “in kind” regulatory conces-
sions.  A clever extension and examination of this point is provided in Douglas T.
Kendall & James E. Ryan, “Paying” for the Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure Exac-
tions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1801, 1803–04 (1995) (describing a
circumvention of Nollan and Dolan in which a governmental entity takes land through
eminent domain, and then offers the landowner a choice between cash compensation
and a development permit—an approach the authors describe as “not obviously
constitutional”).
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SLIDE 10
It might seem, then, that the Takings Clause cannot actually be
violated in a lasting way, once the courts get hold of a case.  To be
sure, during the time when no, or inadequate, compensation has
been paid, there is an ongoing violation of the Takings Clause that
might, in fact, never get addressed through a payment of compensa-
tion.  Moreover, if we contemplate the possibility that a governmental
actor without access to any funds (i.e., a court) can engage in takings,
then this after-the-fact validation through payment might no longer
be available.  The point is not to declare the Takings Clause literally
inviolable, but rather to observe that the clause builds in a liability-
rule fix that so neatly erases the violation and legitimates the underly-
ing act as to effectively take the question of other remedies off the
table—in the nonjudicial context.  If the clause is to be applied in
situations where that fix is unavailable, the question of remedies must
be confronted anew.85
D. Two Borders, Different Patrols
The analysis thus far has focused on ways that actors may run
athwart boundaries, while saying little about how those boundaries are
policed.  Thinking about Slide 8’s two boundaries in tandem leads to
the following observation: courts police the regulatory takings line
more actively than they police the public-use line.86  Institutional com-
85 The problem of remedies is well recognized in the judicial takings literature
and is also evidenced by the conflicting views of the plurality and of Justice Kennedy
in Stop the Beach.
86 By “actively,” I do not mean to suggest anything about the government’s win-
loss rates—an inquiry that would be complicated in any event by selection effects. See
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984).  I mean only that there is more analytic engagement with the ques-
tion of regulatory takings, as evidenced by the raft of complex, interacting tests, than
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petence provides an explanation, and one that is illuminated by the
reasoning in Lingle v. Chevron.  In Lingle, the Court held that the Tak-
ings Clause is meant to protect against undue burdens selectively
placed on particular property owners, while the Due Process Clause is
meant to address issues relating to an improper means-ends fit.
Determining what constitutes an inordinate burden on property own-
ers can be understood as the kind of counter-majoritarian check for
which courts are especially well suited.  Conversely, because determin-
ing the relationship between means and ends is the province of the
nonjudicial branches, judicial review in this area is (under most cir-
cumstances) limited to a highly deferential rational basis test.
Separating out problems of inordinate burdening from problems
of means-ends fit works out less cleanly than the Court’s discussion in
Lingle might suggest.87  Nonetheless, we can draw at least a rough dis-
tinction between the two boundaries depicted in Slide 8 based on
which sort of inquiry dominates.
1. Policing the Public Use Line
As already suggested, the public use line embodies a means-ends
test that is highly deferential to legislative and executive actors, on the
grounds that they are best able to determine how to achieve legitimate
governmental objectives.  If these actors appear to be deploying their
institutional faculties appropriately by, for example, engaging in plan-
ning and remaining free of the influence of any particular rent-
seeker, courts will generally accept their judgment on the public use
issue.
with the question of what counts as a “public use”—at least in the context of the U.S.
Constitution.
87 See Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 525, 529 (2009) (suggesting that the “character of the government action” in the
Penn Central test may reintroduce considerations that look a great deal like substantive
due process). See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Why Lingle Is Half Right, 11 VT. J.
ENVTL L. 421 (2010) (arguing that the “substantially advances a legitimate state inter-
est” test might play a role in takings jurisprudence conceptualized as “boundary main-
tenance” between non-compensable government actions and those that require just
compensation).  One way of approaching the question of whether I am unduly bur-
dened by a particular type of regulatory action is to ask what I get back from it in
expected value terms, if we were to imagine a hypothetical ex ante bargain.  And what
I get back depends, in turn, on the relationship between the regulation and its legiti-
mate governmental goals. See, e.g., Fenster, supra, at 552 (discussing the possibility
that in some regulatory takings cases the state will “be able to identify the increased
property value the owner enjoys as a result of a regulatory program that also restricts
her neighbors’ property”).
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Courts do, however, stringently police the payment of just com-
pensation.88  This too can be understood in terms of the institutional
division of labor suggested above—failure to provide just compensa-
tion relates directly to the problem of inordinate burdens.  The leni-
ent public use test can be criticized to the extent that remaining
undercompensation causes exercises of eminent domain to embed an
element of inordinate burdening,89 but the basic institutional division
of labor it embodies follows the distinction set out in Lingle.90
2. Policing the Regulatory Takings Line
Regulatory takings doctrine is notoriously muddled.91  But this is
in large part because courts are more actively engaged in policing
88 I thank Richard Epstein for raising this point.  As has been well noted, the
constitutional standard for payments of just compensation is fair market value, which
embeds a certain degree of undercompensation. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at R
183; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 74 (8th ed. 2011).  To be sure,
many actual exercises of eminent domain provide richer compensation packages than
fair market value. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent
Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 105, 121–26 (2006).  But this does not eliminate the need
for adequate judicial checks.
89 It would be possible to do more to break out the remaining burden for judicial
scrutiny.  I have argued elsewhere that eminent domain can be usefully broken into
two components—the compensated taking, and the uncompensated appropriation of
the increment by which the compensation is incomplete.  Lee Anne Fennell, Taking
Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 958–59 (2004).  This latter compo-
nent, I argue, should be assessed using standards that resemble those which separate
compensable from non-compensable regulatory takings. See id. at 981–92.  This refor-
mulation would more precisely allocate the means-ends portion of the process to leg-
islative and executive actors, leaving only the issue of inordinate burdens with the
courts.
90 A deferential federal standard also arguably advances the values of federalism
and subsidiarity by allowing states to offer greater protections.  See Ellickson, supra
note 64, at 762–63. R
91 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Mud-
dle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85
VA. L. REV. 741, 743 (1999).  Not all commentators attach a negative connotation to
the muddle, however. See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 87, at 529–30 (“To invoke the R
jargon of software design, this messiness is neither a bug nor a feature in regulatory
takings doctrine but part of its operating instructions . . . .”); Marc R. Poirier, The
Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 190 (2002) (“As an
essentially contested concept, [regulatory takings doctrine] is fertile and generative
precisely because it is inevitably, and perhaps quintessentially, vague and unresolv-
able.”).  Moreover, as James Krier has noted, takings is hardly unique in its doctrinal
difficulty:
[A] lot of questions in the legal world are inherently hard to deal with—and
are so for the same reasons that takings questions are—yet, so far as I can
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whether a given regulatory act crosses the line.  Even if the great
majority of regulatory acts are not viewed as takings, there are enough
instances of pushback to keep the doctrinal wheels churning.  Yet for
all its complexity, regulatory takings doctrine has always been under-
pinned by a basic commitment to allowing governmental actors to
carry on the ordinary business of governance without the constant
need for compensation.  Justice Holmes’s words in Pennsylvania Coal
set up the point nicely: “Government hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law.  As long recognized,
some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to
the police power.”92
Holmes then discusses the scope of this implied limitation,
including the famous line that “if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.”93  What it means for government to go “too
far” has received a great deal of attention, but it is equally useful to
think about the implicit requirement (couched as a limitation on all
property) that government be permitted to “go on” at all.
There are reasons why courts might be especially well qualified to
make this judgment.  As actors that oversee the common law develop-
ment of property, courts are arguably best positioned to know when a
given act interferes so severely with established expectations surround-
ing property as to require compensation, and when instead it merely
instantiates a business-as-usual application of the police power.  The
Court indicated in Lingle that questions of inordinate burden lie at
the heart of the takings analysis,94 and the regulatory takings tests are
generally directed at identifying the kinds of burdens on property
owners that should in fairness be borne by the community as a
whole.95  These questions of burden-assessment, bound up as they are
in issues of background principles about what property means and
see, all of those hard questions taken together have provoked nowhere near
the claims of Babel that run through the takings literature.
James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1150 (1997).
92 Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
93 Id. at 415.
94 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (characterizing takings
tests as “focus[ing] directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes
upon private property rights”).
95 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“The Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just com-
pensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”).
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what expectations accompany it, are ones that courts might seem
especially well-equipped to evaluate.
Some aspects of the Penn Central test do seem to embed questions
of means-ends fit.96  How, for example, can we assess the character of
the government’s action unless we know something about what the
regulation is meant to accomplish?97  How can we know whether a
party is unduly burdened by a regulation unless we know whether the
regulation also produces the promised benefits?  These means-ends
elements would seem to blend due process questions into the takings
analysis on the Court’s own account, making the institutional compe-
tence question harder to parse.  More generally, there is plenty of
room to criticize the specific ways in which regulatory takings doctrine
has developed.  But the dominance of the undue burden and back-
ground principle inquiries in establishing the line between compensa-
ble and noncompensable takings helps to explain the Court’s
relatively greater involvement in policing that line.
III. JUDICIAL TAKINGS, ILLUSTRATED
My discussion to this point has been limited to takings (or alleged
takings) by actors in the political branches.  Can a court, by issuing a
decision impacting property rights, also commit a taking within the
meaning of the Takings Clause?  This question was raised but not
resolved in Stop the Beach, a case that involved a challenge by beach-
front property owners to a Florida Supreme Court decision.98  The
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that the Florida Supreme
Court had not committed a judicial taking.99  The facts of the case are
less important for our purposes than the disagreements that erupted
among the Justices about the existence and possible contours of a
judicial takings doctrine.  A four-Justice plurality (Justice Scalia, joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas) whole-heart-
96 See supra note 87. R
97 See Fenster, supra note 87, at 571 (arguing that after Lingle, the “character fac- R
tor” in the Penn Central test “gives courts the discretion to consider the significance of
the government’s regulatory purpose in cases in which that purpose might justify
exceptional economic harm to the property owner”).
98 The Florida Supreme Court read state property law to permit a legislatively
directed avulsive widening of the public portion of the beach.  The fact that the judi-
cial decision at issue in Stop the Beach followed upon and ratified a legislative act places
it in a different category factually than the purely court-initiated changes I will discuss
here. See infra notes 107-108 and accompanying text. R
99 Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t of Envt’l Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592
(2010).  All eight Justices participating in the case joined the portion of Scalia’s opin-
ion finding that there was no taking.  Justice Stevens recused himself. Id. at 2613.
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edly endorsed the idea of a judicial takings doctrine.  The plurality
maintained that a taking is a taking, regardless of which branch of
government commits it.100  The other Justices expressed doubts about
the viability of such a doctrine, as well as concern about a number of
procedural and remedial issues that would be raised if such a doctrine
were recognized.101  The result was an inconclusive mass of contradic-
tory signals that has become, for property scholars at least, an endless
source of speculation, concern, and fascination.
A primary worry expressed in the judicial takings literature to
date is that an unconstrained doctrine could have devastating effects
on the evolution of the common law of property.102  Indeed, without
any limiting principles capable of saving the ordinary adjudication of
property disputes from takings scrutiny, the enterprise of recognizing
judicial takings at all seems doomed from the outset.103  Some might
respond that the enterprise should be doomed—that judicial takings is
a bad idea for a whole host of practical and conceptual reasons.  But
because four members of the Supreme Court have indicated a willing-
ness to entertain judicial takings challenges, it is worth giving atten-
tion to the question of how such a doctrine might be limited.104  Like
others who have written on this topic, I will assume in what follows
100 See id. at 2601 (plurality opinion) (“It would be absurd to allow a State to do by
judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”).
101 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Sotomayor, argued that the Due Process
Clause, not the Takings Clause, should provide the first line of defense against
improper judicial actions. Id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).  Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, took the plurality to
task for “unnecessarily address[ing] questions of constitutional law that are better left
for another day.” Id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
102 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral
Attack on State Court Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 107–08
(2011); Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE
247 (2011).  Concerns about the federalism implications of a judicial takings doctrine
have also been raised. See, e.g., Dogan & Young, supra; Richard Ruda, Do We Really
Need a Judicial Takings Doctrine?, 35 VT. L. REV. 451, 456–58 (2010). But see Thompson,
supra note 2, at 1509 (maintaining that federalism arguments fail to “explain why we R
should apply different constitutional constraints to state courts than to state legisla-
tures and administrative agencies”).
103 Justice Breyer expressed concerns along these lines in his Stop the Beach concur-
rence, noting “the failure of [the plurality’s] approach to set forth procedural limita-
tions or canons of deference . . . .”  130 S. Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
104 Or as Pen˜alver and Strahilevitz colorfully put it (without necessarily endorsing
the premise behind the metaphor): “When a car is careening off the road, it is better
to have it crash into the bushes than into a crowded cafe´.”  Pen˜alver & Strahilevitz,
supra note 2, at 368. R
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that there can be such a thing as judicial takings.  However, I will sug-
gest some plausible limiting principles that could make judicial tak-
ings something rarely encountered in the wild.105
These limiting principles emerge when we adapt the diagrams
above to the judicial context.  Three features are of particular impor-
tance. The first is the presence of two different, and differently
policed, boundaries.  The second is the category of confiscatory
nontakings. The third is a feature notable for its absence in the earlier
diagrams: a fourth category to add to the triad of no-go zone, free
zone, and pay zone. Following Calabresi and Melamed, there must be
(and is) a fourth possibility in which the government does not take if
the would-be takee pays. Although this possibility has limited applica-
bility to legislative and administrative takings,106 it can play a signifi-
cant role in judicial decisionmaking, as we will see.  Each of these
features suggests a set of potential limits on a judicial takings doctrine.
In combination, they could render judicial takings a nearly null set.
My discussion here will be limited in two important ways.  First, I
focus only on how a judicial takings doctrine might be developed to
govern stand-alone judicial decisions that alter or reinterpret property
rights.  For example, a court might make a pronouncement in a tres-
pass case that affects the rights of many beachfront property owners,
completely independently of any action by a legislature or agency.  In
contrast, many scenarios in which judicial takings challenges might
arise (including Stop the Beach itself) involve judicial ratification of leg-
islative or executive acts that themselves allegedly constitute takings.
These scenarios tangle together two questions: 1) what forum(s)
should hear the challenge to the initial governmental act? and 2) do
the effects of the court’s decision, above and beyond ratifying the
underlying act of the nonjudicial actor, constitute a taking?107  The
first question implicates procedural issues that I will not address
here,108 while the second question can be analyzed as if it were the
product of a stand-alone judicial decision.
105 See Dogan & Young, supra note 102, at 134 (contending that “[e]xcept in unu- R
sual situations, judicial takings should remain the stuff of law review articles and plu-
rality opinions, rather than the law of the land”).
106 See infra text accompanying notes 147–150. R
107 See Barros, supra note 2, at 958 (explaining that this set of cases cannot be R
completely dispensed with by addressing the legislative or executive taking if the court
also influenced property rights with its pronouncement).  It is the marginal effect of
the judicial action, however, that should be of interest, since the underlying nonjudi-
cial act can be treated on its own.
108 For discussion of procedural issues as they relate to judicial takings, see Barros,
supra note 2, at 943–53. R
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Second, my goal in this Part, as in the piece as a whole, is analytic
rather than normative.  I show how limits on a judicial takings doc-
trine might be formulated in a way that would be consistent with
existing taking doctrines.  In so doing, I mean neither to endorse
those existing doctrines nor advocate any particular way of accommo-
dating judicial takings doctrine to them.  Instead, I mean to present
some underexplored limiting principles that could render the doc-
trine more tractable, if that result were desired.  Whether or not any
judicial takings doctrine should be pursued is another question, and
one I do not take up here.109
A. Two Boundaries, Again
Consider again the two contested boundaries set out in Slide 8:
the public use line and the regulatory takings line.  Thinking about
how each of these boundaries maps onto the judicial takings context
raises important issues of institutional competence.110
1. Adapting the Public Use Line
The public use line, as framed above, separates the realm of legit-
imate government takings with just compensation (the pay zone)
from due process violations that flunk the rational basis means-ends
test (the no-go zone).  In the nonjudicial context, this line is outfitted
with a door through which governmental actors consciously enter on
the understanding that they must pay.  An important initial question
is whether judges have access to this same door.
The fact that courts have no purse might suggest a negative
answer111 for two reasons.  First, just as it would violate our society’s
109 Nonetheless, the analysis here does bear on that question in the following way:
the easier it is to create a manageable judicial takings doctrine, the harder it is to rule
out the possibility on prudential grounds, and, conversely, the more convoluted the
conceptual and doctrinal twists are required to make such a doctrine plausible, the
harder the case for recognizing it becomes.  I will leave it to the reader to decide
whether what follows makes a judicial takings doctrine look more or less viable.
110 Other commentators have similarly focused on questions of institutional com-
petence in considering the question of judicial takings. See, e.g., Echeverria, supra
note 47, at 485–86 (discussing the role of “comparative institutional analysis” in con- R
sidering judicial takings); Lehavi, supra note 2 (discussing institutional issues arising R
from conceptualizing judges both as “lawmakers” and as actors charged with review-
ing the acts of others).
111 Thompson discusses the related assumption by most courts and commentators
“that the taking protections, if applied to the judiciary . . . would bar the judiciary
from making any change constituting a taking.  This is because the judiciary has no
purse from which to pay compensation.”  Thompson, supra note 2, at 1499. R
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transaction structure112 to enter a restaurant and eat a meal if you
knew, going in, that you had no means to pay, so too would it seem to
be beyond the power of courts to consciously incur financial obliga-
tions that they have no wherewithal to meet.  This is not a complete
answer, however, because courts might order other parties to pay
money.113  The real issue is whether courts have any legitimate basis
on which to access those monies to fund their own takings.  This
brings us to a second reason for doubting the power of courts to
undertake eminent domain, suggested by Justice Kennedy, in his Stop
the Beach opinion: that the political branches, not the courts, are the
proper parties to decide when a taking “makes financial sense.”114
Here it becomes helpful to think again about the public use door,
and what it is meant to let in and screen out.  The basic test for public
use is (or at least approximates) the same loose-fitting rational basis
test that applies to exercises of the police power generally.115  Moreo-
ver, courts (at least in interpreting federal constitutional require-
ments) have told legislative and executive branch actors that they can
largely decide when to let themselves in.  There are some limits, but
the overall approach is highly deferential.  This is explicable in the
context of a means-ends test.  Legislative and executive actors are
thought to be institutionally competent to make judgments about how
best to achieve legitimate ends in a way that courts are not.
This does not mean, however, that courts are wholly disabled by
principles of substantive due process from making means-ends judg-
ments in the course of their work.116  We could hardly expect a court
to decide what counts as possession in a given context, or how an ease-
112 See Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 289, 301–03 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (dis-
cussing lawbreaking in terms of “transaction structures”).
113 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1513–14.  Whether their orders will be heeded R
or not is another matter. See id. at 1514 n.250.  Thompson discusses some alternatives
that would leave to the legislature the final decision about whether or not to pay. Id.
at 1513–21.  Under one model (“automatic compensation”), payment is ordered
unless the legislature overrides the change by statute, while under another (“legisla-
tive choice”), the change is made contingent on the legislature authorizing the pay-
ment.  For a recent take on how courts might incur and meet financial obligations
associated with legal transitions, see generally Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin,
Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (2012).
114 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2614 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
115 See supra note 17 and text accompanying notes 50–60. R
116 A broad reading of Justice Kennedy’s invocation of the Due Process Clause as a
limit on judicial authority in Stop the Beach might seem to tend in this direction,
although Kennedy does emphasize the competence of courts to make incremental
changes. See Lehavi, supra note 2, at 547–49 (discussing Kennedy’s argument and R
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ment is established, or how privity requirements should apply, without
resorting at some level to logical inferences about how the world
works and what sorts of rules tend to produce what sorts of results.
Justice Kennedy’s invocation of the fiscal judgments that are impli-
cated by the exercise of eminent domain offers a much more specific
basis for limiting the court’s role.  John Echeverria expands on Ken-
nedy’s point, arguing that “only the political branches are in a posi-
tion to make the tradeoffs between potentially expensive takings and
other public funding priorities” and citing the Takings Clause’s “virtu-
ally unique money-mandating nature”117
Thus, courts appear institutionally ill-positioned to make the fis-
cally sensitive means-ends judgments that would give them access to
the door to the pay zone.  Judicial acts of condemnation might be
regarded as due process violations in the following sense: the court is
selecting property for condemnation, but lacks the budgetary and
political data to enable it to coherently make the means-ends assess-
ment that is demanded in such a case.118  If that assessment is correct,
then the judicial takings version of the public use line lacks a door;
conscious choices to enter the pay zone are impermissible.  The oval is
instead bounded by institutional razor wire as shown in Slide 11.119
noting difficulties distinguishing “incremental modifications” from larger changes in
property rights).
117 Echeverria, supra note 47, at 487.  As Echeverria explains, this argument is pre- R
mised on Kennedy’s view “that exercises of the eminent domain power necessarily
entail a government obligation to pay just compensation, a premise that Justice Scalia
disputes.” Id.  For the reasons elaborated in the text and images above, I agree with
Kennedy’s premise.  However, it does not follow from the fact that an actor has an
obligation to pay just compensation that compensation is the only available remedy
when the obligation has been breached. See infra Part III.D.2.
118 See Echeverria, supra note 47, at 487. R
119 I do not mean to suggest that judges are more strictly excluded from paying for
improper acts than they are from just engaging in them for free.  The razor wire
merely conveys that a boundary that is permeable for a legislature is not for a court.
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SLIDE 11
Judges might still try to engage in conscious appropriations of
private property for public use in a manner akin to the exercise of
eminent domain, but, on this account, those acts fall outside the
realm of legitimacy as violations of due process.
One challenge to that story runs as follows.  Unless there is some
federal limit on state separation of powers that would rule out courts’
use of the condemnation power even if state law delegated it to them, it
would appear that state law (that is, its failure to make such a delega-
tion) is the only thing that makes the court’s act of condemnation
impermissible.120  It might then seem to follow that a given condem-
nation could be both a compensable taking (properly within the pay
zone as a matter of federal law) and a prohibited act under state
law.121  Yet here, as above,122 it makes sense to limit what will count as
“public use” for federal purposes to public uses that are defined as
120 Clearly, it would be inconsistent with the Takings Clause for a legislature to get
the judiciary to do condemnations on its behalf without paying just compensation.
See Dogan & Young, supra note 102, at 110 (“If a state could avoid paying just compen- R
sation by transferring its condemnation authority to the courts, that would invite a
fairly obvious end run around the Takings Clause.”).  A different question is whether
there would be any federal constitutional constraint on a legislature delegating to a
court the power to condemn along with a commitment to pay for any takings that the
court decides are necessary.  In Stop the Beach, Justice Scalia indicates no such con-
straint exists, contrary to the suggestion implicit in some of Justice Kennedy’s com-
ments.  Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2605 (2010) (plurality opinion).
121 See Somin, supra note 63, at 97.  Somin’s argument differs subtly from the one R
in the text insofar as he does not view compensation as the only remedy. See id.
122 This is another incarnation of the issue flagged earlier in connection with
more stringent state public use requirements. See supra notes 61–69 and accompany- R
ing text.
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such by state law.123  The due process requirement that a public pur-
pose be pursued must also implicitly require that it be a purpose of,
and pursued by, an authorized state actor using authorized state
means.124  Thus, whether or not one thinks that a state could constitu-
tionally delegate condemnation authority to a court, the fact that no
such authority has in fact been delegated would seem to preclude pur-
poseful access to the pay zone as a matter of federal law.125
How then should we think about a situation in which a court
grants an expanded easement for public beach access—an act that
might seem to take private property for public use?126  One response
is that it would be highly unusual for a court to announce that it has
decided on its own, without any law on its side, to take property away
from one party to give to the public.127  Rather, the decision will be
couched as a vindication or rediscovery of pre-existing rights vouch-
safed to the public, to which the private parties’ claims were always
really subordinate (even if this fact somehow escaped the notice of
123 See Zinn, supra note 43, at 249 (arguing that “unauthorized agency actions by R
definition do not advance public uses” and referencing the Court’s statement in First
English that Takings Clause analysis is limited to “otherwise proper” government
actions (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of
L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987))).
124 See Echeverria, supra note 47, at 485 (discussing the possibility “that judicial R
takings would be ultra vires, and not the acts of government at all”); Zinn, supra note
43, at 286 (“Where a regulatory action lacks legislative authorization, the legislature R
cannot be said to have approved the action’s purpose as public.”).  Presumably no
one would think it would be a compensable taking under federal law if a private party
(call her Robin Hood) commandeers another individual’s chattel property and uses
the proceeds to pursue what she personally believes to be a public purpose.  There
seems to be no basis on which to distinguish the case in which the court acts outside
of the authority vested in it by state law.
125 There is authority for the proposition that the legislature cannot evade the
compensation requirement of the Takings Clause by authorizing actions that amount
to takings by statute and formally withholding condemnation power. See Zinn, supra
note 43, at 245 n.4.  The situation that state courts are in is quite distinct, however, R
assuming they have been given no authority whatever to engage in eminent domain.
Nonetheless, this argument does help explain why courts might be capable of com-
mitting non-eminent domain takings in the course of carrying out their authorized
judicial duties. See infra text accompanying note 134. R
126 Beach access examples are prevalent in the literature on judicial takings, as
well as in the case law to date. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1501 (“[M]any of the R
cases that have been challenged as judicial takings over the last decade have
expanded public access to, or called for preservation of, unique resources such as
beaches and waterways.”).
127 See infra Part III.B (discussing the sorts of circumstances that might lead to
such a pronouncement).
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courts for quite some time).128  It is fair to worry that courts may disin-
genuously invoke past rights,129 but the upshot of their doing so is not
a free pass.  For one thing, there may be reputational constraints
against handing down a decision that is plainly based on a misreading
of precedent or misapplication of longstanding common law princi-
ples.  Nor is a judge necessarily off the hook as far as judicial takings
are concerned merely because she frames the decision in a way that
takes it out of the mold of conscious takings for public use.  There is
yet another boundary to consider.
2. Adapting the Regulatory Takings Line
The regulatory takings line in the nonjudicial model separates
ordinary exercises of the police power that do not require compensa-
tion (the free zone), from regulatory takings requiring compensation
(the pay zone).  What does this line denote in the judicial takings con-
text?  Justice Holmes’s concern that government be allowed to “go
on” applies equally in this context, and offers some basic guidance in
locating the line.  Of course, what it means for government to “go on”
means something different when we are talking about a judicial actor
than when we are talking about a legislative or administrative body.
As a conceptual matter, the line that separates compensable judi-
cial takings from ordinary judicial activity depends in significant part
on what it means to carry out the ordinary work of adjudicating prop-
erty disputes in a common law system.130  Although property tends to
be highly inertial, it is also a creature of the common law, and hence
subject to processes of growth and evolution.  Property owners know
that their holdings may change in a variety of ways as law changes, and
they are compensated in kind for this by the benefits of a property
system that is capable of adapting to new circumstances and condi-
128 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1478 (“Courts seldom confess to changing the law, R
claiming instead to clarify, integrate, or correct prior precedents.”).
129 Justice Scalia worried in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council that giving a pass
to all harm-prevention efforts would test only whether a legislature had “a stupid
staff.”  505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992).  An analogous “stupid law clerk” argument
might apply here, were it not for the fact that other checks on judicial behavior exist,
as explained in the text.
130 Scholars have expressed concern that “the everyday business of common-law
courts” could be subject to takings challenges.  Dogan & Young, supra note 102, at R
112.  Cf. Merrill, supra note 87, at 424–28 (describing a “boundary maintenance” R
approach to regulatory takings that examines both how much a given regulatory act
resembles eminent domain and how much it resembles an exercise of the police
power).
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tions.131  This does not seem particularly controversial—nearly every-
one would agree that a certain amount of change and adaptation is
part of the overall property bargain.  But how much change, how
quickly, and with what kinds of effects?
The answers will depend on one’s conception of property, as Bar-
ton Thompson emphasized in his classic exploration of judicial tak-
ings.132  An initial and fundamental question is how to establish the
baseline from which to measure change.  If the baseline can always be
moved (or, rather, can be found to have “always” been in another
place), it is hard see how anything can be “taken.”  Thus, a purely
positivist approach in which property law aligns with whatever the
state courts have to say on the matter would suggest a virtually nonex-
istent role for the judicial takings doctrine.133  The absence of a judi-
cial takings doctrine would not leave courts free to do anything they
wanted with respect to property law.  Limits, however, would emanate
from sources of law other than the Takings Clause.  For example, due
process independently prohibits courts from consciously undertaking
an act that is the functional equivalent of eminent domain, for the
reasons already given.  Similarly, bribery and corruption would be
policed independently of any judicial takings doctrine, since such acts
would never be for public use under any interpretation.
If judicial takings are in fact a null set, then the universe of judi-
cial acts looks like Slide 12.
131 See EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 195–215 (discussing in-kind compensation); R
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
“Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1219–24 (1967) (applying a Rawlsian
analysis to just compensation questions).  We also have a federal system that enables
state courts to learn from and offer guidance to each other (just as state legislators or
agencies might), and the prospects for adoption, adaptation, and experimentation
that this entails are also arguably an important part of what it means to own property
in the United States.
132 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1522–41. R
133 See id. at 1531–38.
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SLIDE 12
If we rule out (for present expositional purposes) the possibility
that judicial takings are nonexistent, then the task remains of locating
the line between ordinary exercises of the judicial power and compen-
sable judicial takings.  This judicial takings line is shown in Slide 13.
SLIDE 13
Even if one believes that many of the ways in which courts might
violate the rights of property owners would fall under some other con-
stitutional rubric, such as substantive due process, the judicial takings
line must still be addressed unless judicial takings is deemed to be a
null set.  No matter how much scholarly energy is poured into deter-
mining the line between legitimate and impermissible government
acts (what we might think of as the “edge of oval” inquiry), we still
must contend with the line between compensable legitimate acts and
noncompensable ones.
Two preliminary points about this line require attention.  First is
the question of whether it is even possible for courts to cross over into
the “pay zone,” given their lack of budgets to pay for takings.  When
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reached from the business-as-usual side, the pay zone represents only
a “must pay” zone rather than one in which payment has already been
rendered, as discussed above.  This is not a satisfying answer, however,
if courts would never be able to provide compensation under any cir-
cumstances.  If we are going to rule out judicial exercises of eminent
domain on the grounds that courts cannot pay, why not these sorts of
judicial takings as well?  One distinction is that judicial exercises of
eminent domain fail for a second reason, that of falling outside
courts’ institutional role as defined by state law, while the adjudicative
work that might “go too far” falls well within that role.134  In addition,
although courts cannot access funding for condemnations, they do
have access to various forms of in-kind compensation and other tools
through which parties to disputes can be made to compensate each
other.  These alternatives might be employed in cases where inadver-
tent lapses into the pay zone occur while courts are carrying out their
ordinary work.135
Second, more important than the location of the line is the ques-
tion of who will police it, and with what level of scrutiny or deference.
I suggested above that courts engage in fairly complex and active man-
agement of the regulatory takings line and show a willingness to
expend significant judicial resources to determine on which side of a
given line a particular act lies.  This I attributed to their institutional
competence in evaluating the effects of background principles and
the burdens that restrictions on property will impose.  Those same
points hold true where courts must evaluate their own conduct rela-
tive to the judicial takings line.  Courts presumably know how to iden-
tify and apply background principles, and how to manage incremental
change from existing baselines in ways that do not impose inordinate
burdens.136  In short, courts might be thought institutionally well-
equipped to make sure that their own decisions do not go “too far.”
Accepting this principle would not mean that there would be no fed-
eral constitutional check on the actions of state courts, but it does
suggest that the review would be highly deferential.137
134 See supra text accompanying notes 123–125. R
135 I will have more to say about this later. See infra Part III.D.2.
136 See Dogan & Young, supra note 102, at 115 (“Because they generally act incre- R
mentally and in the context of specific factual disputes, we think courts bring particu-
lar institutional advantages to the process of legal change.”).
137 It is true that any institutional advantages attributed to courts in general would
apply to the reviewing court as well as to the court initially making the decision that
allegedly committed a taking.  Here, however, principles of federalism play a role,
given the general authority state courts have to determine the content of state prop-
erty law, as well as the greater familiarity that state courts will have with their own state
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It might initially seem odd to entrust the same actor whose
actions are governed by a given line with the task of policing it.  But
this is just what is done with respect to the public use line.  The
Supreme Court has shown itself willing to defer to judgments by legis-
lative and executive actors about what counts as public use, with rela-
tively minimal limits, again based on assessments of institutional
competence.  If legislative and administrative bodies are largely free to
self-certify that their acts fall within public use in cases of eminent
domain, it seems no more anomalous to allow courts to largely deter-
mine for themselves whether their acts are on the noncompensable or
compensable side of the line.138  The fact that courts do not have
resources of their own with which to pay compensation only strength-
ens this point.  Even though courts will wish to avoid a finding that
their acts amounted to judicial takings for other reasons (like the
desire to avoid being reversed),139 the fact that they do not have reve-
nue and payment streams to manage would arguably reduce any
temptation to substitute “free” inputs for purchased ones.140
B. Confiscatory Nontakings Revisited
Suppose we accept the premise above that courts are left largely
free to self-police the judicial-takings line but are deemed institution-
law.  For further discussion of the federalism implications of judicial takings law, see,
e.g., Dogan & Young, supra note 102; Ruda, supra note 102, at 456–58. R
138 Similar in spirit is the possibility Thompson discusses of allowing for a judicial
takings concept for “exhortative or pedagogical purposes” without having federal
courts undertake active review of state court decisions.  Thompson, supra note 2, at R
1496.
139 See Pen˜alver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 335 (discussing the possibility that R
courts would incur “reputational costs” of a reversal if a judicial taking were found,
and possibly even “a greater stigma” associated with the takings finding itself).
140 This is a concern with ordinary takings, and it forms an efficiency justification
for just compensation. See POSNER, supra note 88, at 73 (observing that “government R
would have an incentive to substitute land for cheaper inputs that were, however,
more expensive to the government” were it not for the “just compensation” require-
ment).  Of course, even legislative and executive actors do not literally pay out of their
own pockets; they have access to revenues raised coercively through taxation.  It is
questionable how closely the political price that they pay to engage in compensated
takings corresponds to the amount of the compensation itself. See Levinson, supra
note 12, at 348; Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 R
HARV. L. REV. 915, 969–71 (2005).  But whatever checks just compensation does place
on political actors are surely blunted for judicial actors. See  Bloom & Serkin, supra
note 113, at 577 (“At best the effect of compensation [for judicial takings] will be R
diffuse and occluded . . . .”); Pen˜alver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 336 (observing R
that Levinson’s argument about the potential inefficacy of just compensation “carries
even more force as far as the judiciary is concerned”).
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ally unable to engage in condemnations for public use.  How, then,
might we approach instances in which a court declares outright that it
is changing the law in a way that represents a sharp break from the
past and that seems to impose inordinate burdens on some property
owners?
Imagine, for example, that a court in a northern state declares
that, although property law in the state has always allowed owners to
keep hunters off their land, this rule must be updated to permit those
hunting polar bears to enter the lands of others without liability.
Polar bears, it turns out, have become a scourge in the area after
being displaced from their native habitat due to global warming, and
the hungry, disgruntled bears are creating a grave threat to the popu-
lation.  We can also specify that the bears are not distributed ran-
domly in the state but instead have particular “attack zones” that have
been well mapped out by local authorities, so that an identifiable two
percent of property owners are affected.
One possibility is that this is that rare entity, a judicial taking.  But
another possibility should also be considered, reasoning by analogy to
the categories of confiscatory nontakings that already exist in takings
doctrine.  Even acts that appropriate or destroy property may not
count as takings under certain sets of circumstances, and an exigency
like the one specified may well qualify for reasons like those that per-
mit tearing down houses to stop fires or damaging convenience stores
to apprehend criminals.141  If the animating principle is to avoid sin-
gling out some property owners for undue burdens,142 then the non-
random nature of the property affected might present a problem.
(On the other hand, if the court were to state its principle more
broadly to encompass the pursuit of any marauding beasts, whether
the polar bears that are creating the current crisis, or other threaten-
ing animals that may present similar crises in the future, the incidence
of the impact would be less predictable).  Yet another response would
rely on in-kind compensation or average reciprocity of advantage to
141 See text accompanying notes 35-37, supra. Another way to address the issue R
would be to characterize it as consistent with existing state property law insofar as
there are overarching doctrines of necessity that are only being applied to a new set-
ting.  This observation connects to a larger issue about the level of generality at which
property law is thought to operate.  When we assess whether property law has
“changed,” we must make some assumption about whether property law is made up of
narrow doctrinal rules, broad overarching principles, or something in between.  I
thank Jim Krier for discussions on this point.
142 See Levmore, supra  note 40, at 1344–48 (1991); see also Michelman, supra note R
131, at 1217 (distinguishing “randomly generated” losses from those that are strategic R
impositions of a “self-determining and purposive” majority); Thompson, supra note 2, R
at 1477–78 (citing and discussing Michelman on this point).
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argue that the bear-rich areas are not only more heavily burdened by
trespasses by bear hunters, they are more greatly benefited as well.
What about a less dramatic case involving beachfront property?
Suppose that a court simply states outright that henceforth a new pol-
icy is in effect: although history and precedent running as far back as
the memory of humankind has given the public only the portion of
the beach up to the mean high tide line, the public may now access an
additional 100 landward feet of beach.  Such forthrightness of pur-
pose is likely to be occasioned by some pressing need—if not a public
emergency, then some seismic shift in the resources that people need
for survival, or some other broad societal change that calls for a
realignment of property rights.  Suppose, for example, that the water
had become too polluted in an area for anyone to enter, so that get-
ting access to the mean high tide line was not enough to allow anyone
to really enjoy the beach.  Yet the result may be to single out an identi-
fiable class of the population (owners of beachfront property) and
force them to contribute to the good of the populace as a whole.
The court may be deemed to have significant latitude to adminis-
ter the public-trust doctrine, just as there is great latitude where it
comes to navigational servitudes, but it is not unimaginable that some
acts would still go too far.  The fact that forfeitures that comply with
due process requirements are not deemed to be takings also muddies
the waters in a more global sense by suggesting that, in some contexts,
the provision of procedural due process pulls a given act out of the
takings realm altogether.
These issues are complex ones that I cannot resolve here, but the
well-established fact that not all acts that look and feel like appropria-
tions actually count as takings is important to keep in mind in think-
ing about the judicial takings line.  Slide 14 brings back the
confiscatory nontakings corner of Slide 7’s triangle of outright appro-
priation.  As already suggested, courts cannot (legitimately) undertake
condemnations; hence the eminent domain portion of the triangle
does not show up in the judicial edition of this image.  But, like their
nonjudicial counterparts, courts can engage in a variety of noncom-
pensable acts that do result in the appropriation or destruction of
property.
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SLIDE 14
C. Zone Four?
Anyone who has spent a great deal of time with Calabresi and
Melamed’s classic Cathedral article will be unable to look at the three
zones depicted in the takings diagrams (the “free zone,” the “pay
zone,” and the “no-go zone”) without asking the question: isn’t there a
fourth zone?  Calabresi and Melamed developed their famous four-
rule scheme in the context of a private nuisance dispute between a
factory and a homeowner, which a court could resolve in any of four
ways: by granting the entitlement to the homeowner and protecting it
with a property rule (Rule 1, injunctive relief); by granting the entitle-
ment to the homeowner and protecting it with a liability rule (Rule 2,
damages); by granting the entitlement to the factory and protecting it
with a property rule (Rule 3, no relief); or, innovatively, by granting
the entitlement to the factory and protecting it with a liability rule
(Rule 4, compensated injunction).
With respect to governmental takings, the “no-go zone” would
seem to correspond to Rule 1; these takings can be enjoined alto-
gether, and are not validated by payment.  The “pay zone” looks like
Rule 2, with the just compensation rule operating like liability rule
protection for the property owner.143  Actions the government can
undertake for free fit with a Rule 3 regime; the property owner gets
no relief.144  Rule 4 in this context would work something like this: the
143 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1108 (observing that “eminent R
domain is simply one of numerous instances in which society uses liability rules”).
144 Property rule protection is not entirely accurate here.  Insofar as the property
owner cannot freely bargain with the government to keep it from regulating, a type of
inalienability rule applies.
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owner could unilaterally get the government not to appropriate the
property by making a specified payment.145
The possibility that property owners could pay the government
not to take their property has surfaced in the law and economics liter-
ature in the context of discussing how inefficient takings might be
avoided.146  The concern is that governmental entities might strategi-
cally threaten to take in order to collect payments.  The same or a
different governmental entity might even threaten to take repeatedly
from the same owner.147  An owner, foreseeing this, would never
bother paying the government not to take, removing whatever
Coasean check the ability to bargain over the taking might otherwise
have added.148  The fact that political actors cannot bind future deci-
sion makers rules out the kind of permanent bargain that would
145 See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 81, at 331 (explaining that “[i]n the land R
regulation context, the ‘rule-four’ approach entitles a landowner to free itself from
regulation by compensating the government”); Krier, supra note 5, at 25 (raising “the R
example of citizens paying the government a judicially determined amount to turn off
the regulation machine”); see also Note, Taking Back Takings: A Coasean Approach to
Regulation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 914, 924 (1993) (arguing that “society can achieve effi-
cient levels of regulation either by requiring the state to compensate owners or by
allowing owners to buy exemptions to regulation”).  My focus in the text is on appli-
cations of Rule 4 to acts that would otherwise be takings (so that the landowner buys
out the government’s option to take), but as the citations above suggest, Rule 4 could
be construed more broadly to include buying out a wide range of regulatory acts of
the political branches (through user fees, tradable permits, and so on).  I thank Eric
Biber and Saul Levmore for discussions on this point.
146 See Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON.
473, 480 (1976) (explaining that under conditions of zero transaction costs, eminent
domain would produce optimal results because a landowner who valued the property
above the expected court award could “offer the buyer the difference to prevent the
taking of the parcel”); Benjamin E. Hermalin, An Economic Analysis of Takings, 11 J. L
ECON. & ORG. 64, 72–73 (1995) (presenting a “buy-back rule” in which an owner
retains the property only “if she pays the state the social benefit,” and stating that this
will achieve the “first-best outcome” if the government is benevolent); see also THOMAS
J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN 93–96 (2011) (discussing
Hermalin’s buy-back rule).
147 See William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Com-
ments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 278
n.19 (1988) (mentioning “landowners’ anticipation that their property may be
retaken once they repurchase their rights” as a possible impediment to payments to
avoid takings).
148 This connects to a larger problem of multiple takings that has been identified
with liability rule protection. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus
Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 765–66 (1996). But see
Oren Bar-Gill & Nicola Persico, Exchange Efficiency with Weak Property Rights (2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2161659 (arguing that liability rules that enable
multiple takings can nonetheless support exchange efficiency).
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immunize property from a later taking—or a later threatened tak-
ing.149  Even if such a binding bargain could be made, the problem of
excessive initial takings threats would remain.150
Applying a Rule 4 approach in the judicial context, however,
might present fewer worries, for reasons that can best be appreciated
by considering an example.  Imagine an adverse possession dispute
involving a possessor who unwittingly installed a flight of steps that
encroached trivially on a neighbor’s land.151  Suppose that existing
law in the jurisdiction makes state of mind irrelevant to an adverse
possession claim, and that all other elements of adverse possession are
clearly met—it is a slam dunk case in the possessor-stairbuilder’s favor
under settled law.  The court, however, decides to add a “bad faith”
requirement to its adverse possession rubric, something that has never
before been required in that jurisdiction.152  Because this possessor’s
encroachment was accidental, he does not meet the new requirement;
the court therefore rules in favor of the record owner.  The possessor
might then try to argue that the strip of land upon which it had
encroached has been judicially taken from it by this new requirement.
We have already seen that the court has some good responses to
this claim, including the fact that the common law must be able to
evolve and that everyone benefits when property law is nimble enough
149 A bonding mechanism or escrow fund that would guarantee money back upon
a later threatened retaking might be used to address this issue.  More generally, the
difficulty the government has keeping commitments is matched by entrenchment
devices that make it harder for the government to later change its mind, and these
devices can support certain kinds of durable deals. See generally Christopher Serkin,
Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
879 (2011).
150 It might be possible to successfully construct a limited form of “pay not to take”
through the use of an auction mechanism to select parcels within a designated rede-
velopment area, where not all parcels are necessary to the project. See Robert G.
Hammond, Selling Eminent Domain Exemptions: A Mechanism to Reveal Private Val-
ues, unpublished manuscript on file with author; see also Scott Duke Kominers & E.
Glen Weyl, Holdout in the Assembly of Complements: A Problem for Market Design, 102 AM.
ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 360 (2012) (distinguishing different types of assembly
problems).  A developer’s offer to forgo the right to have properties condemned
within project boundaries upon payment by the owner was at issue in Didden v. Village
of Port Chester, 322 F. Supp. 2d 385, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d 173 F. App’x 931 (2d Cir.
2006).
151 Adverse possession is another standard factual template employed in judicial
takings literature; the facts here resemble those in Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258
(N.J. 1969).
152 Such a standard would allow an adverse possessor to gain title only if she were
aware that the land she was occupying was not her own. See Lee Anne Fennell, Effi-
cient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037,
1037–38 (2006).
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to respond to societal changes and new conditions.  That this is not a
compensable taking is probably already overdetermined.  But if there
were doubt on that point, consider the following: in ruling for the
record owner, the court need not, and in fact probably would not,
grant injunctive relief to the record owner and force the innocent
encroacher to destroy his improvements.  Rather, a liability rule solu-
tion would be most likely, one in which the court allows the possessor
to forcibly buy the encroached-upon land.  Normally we would think
of this remedy as a garden variety application of Rule 2; the
encroacher can pay and stay.  But when put into the context of an
alleged judicial taking, it offers something more: the ability of the
party alleging a taking to keep any physical taking from occurring by
making a payment.  From this perspective, the remedy looks some-
thing like Rule 4.153
To be sure, the party who must make a payment just to hang onto
what he thought was his is still losing something.  But, interestingly,
offering the option to pay may alter the doctrinal consequences.
Recall that in the context of nonjudicial takings, significant diminu-
tions in value are often viewed as perfectly consistent with noncom-
pensable governmental actions.  The law treats a physical
encroachment (or something that might as well be one) differently
from a mere decrease in value.154  Similarly, taxes are treated much
differently from takings,155 and user fees, impact fees, and other pay-
ments are often collected without triggering a compensation require-
ment.  Thus, there is reason to think that the “pay not to take” Rule 4
regime I describe here would frequently fall on the noncompensable
side of the line.156
153 Carol Rose has suggested instead that eminent domain itself maps onto Rule 4.
Rose, supra note 5, at 2180–81.  The mirror-image quality of the Calabresi & Melamed R
taxonomy makes this interpretation equally valid as the one in the text; in that case,
however, there would still be a shadow Rule 2 in which the would-be condemnee
(who is made to stop the use upon the government’s payment) would himself be able
to continue the use (that is stop the condemnation) upon paying.
154 See Armen A. Alchian, Property Rights, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume, eds.) (2d ed. 2008) (“It is
important to note that it is the physical use and condition of a good that are pro-
tected from the action of others [by private property rights], not its exchange
value.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 955, 957–59 (1993) (criticizing
the distinction takings law draws between physical takings and regulatory takings).
155 See Amnon Lehavi, The Taxing/Taking Taxonomy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1239
(2010).
156 There is at least one indication in the other direction.  The Kohler Act, 1921
Pa. Laws 1198, which was held to work a taking in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
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This is not to suggest that takings law would be friendly to legisla-
tive or executive actors who threatened takings and then agreed to
halt the condemnation upon payment.157  In those settings, some-
thing more than a mere financial burden is at issue—the concern that
the burden is being manufactured for its own sake, to effect a transfer
payment.  But courts have no independent ability to reach out and
burden citizens by threatening to take things from them if they do not
pay.  Moreover, when property owners do pay to avoid some injunctive
result, the court has access to tools that enable it to make that deal
stick.  For example, in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., the court
explained that if the factory paid permanent damages, the injunction
would be lifted and replaced by a servitude on the neighbors’ land
that would preclude them from bringing additional actions based on
the factory’s operations.  That servitude would run with the land and
provide lasting protection for the factory for as long as it chose to
operate.158  Courts cannot keep other plaintiffs from complaining
U.S. 393 (1922), was accompanied by the Fowler Act, 1921 Pa. Laws 1192, which gave
coal companies an option to pay a two percent tax on the coal instead of being sub-
jected to the Kohler Act’s limitations. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Search for Seizure:
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon in Context, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 21 (1986).  Because
neither Holmes’s majority opinion nor Brandeis’s dissent in Mahon mentioned the
Fowler Act, it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the relevance of this option.
See id.
157 Although not directly on point, the Court’s approach in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994), suggests that concerns about strategic governmental behavior loom large.
Those cases differ from the Rule 4 cases I am discussing in the text in that the govern-
mental restriction to be lifted was not one that would itself amount to a taking; rather
it was in each case assumed to be a legitimate exercise of the police power that would
not require compensation.  The “takings” angle in these cases stemmed instead from
the concession that the landowners were asked to give up in order to get the regula-
tion lifted.  Because this concession would have been a taking if carried out indepen-
dent of the regulatory change, the Court held that it could not be required unless it
met standards of nexus and proportionality.  Nonetheless, statements in Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 554 U.S. 528 (2005), that suggest Nollan and Dolan may be limited
to physical exactions (as opposed to monetary impact fees) would be consistent with
my textual distinction between monetary and in-kind losses. Koontz v. St. John’s River
Water Management District (cert. granted, Oct. 5, 2012) may provide clearer guidance
on the conceptual boundaries of the Court’s exactions jurisprudence.
158 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970). To be
sure, this protection takes the form of a property interest that could itself be extin-
guished through later legislative or judicial action.  For example, a new legislative
scheme might give Atlantic Cement’s neighbors the right to sue for damages regard-
less of any contrary servitudes burdening their land.  That extinguishing act could in
turn be the subject of a takings claim.  Whether or not that claim is successful, it
would not create a situation in which the factory would be asked to repurchase an
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about effects on them that were not treated in an earlier case, but
those additional complaints would again not have the character of
strategic governmental behavior.
Zone 4, then, can be designated a “reverse payment zone,” one in
which a court’s initial act must be lifted upon a payment flowing from,
and not to, the affected property owner.  Whereas the traditional Rule
4 relief is a compensated injunction, in this context, we would have a
compensated non-injunction.  Without the reverse payment feature,
acts in this zone would be judicial takings.  The deciding court could
voluntarily provide a reverse payment feature that might largely
immunize the act against a takings claim, or a reviewing court could
find that the act falls within the reverse payment zone and apply that
feature itself.
This approach would again shrink the operative range of judicial
takings by providing a different way to validate acts that go over what
would otherwise be the judicial takings line.  The results are shown in
Slide 15.
SLIDE 15
D. The Not-Quite-Null Set
I have explained above how judicial takings, conditional on being
recognized at all, could plausibly become nearly a null set.  Institu-
tional competence considerations argue for a largely self-policing judi-
cial takings line, and the category of judicial takings is further reduced
entitlement to impose impacts on its neighbors.  If it is legally possible for such a
servitude to burden the neighbors’ property, the factory would already own it under
principles of property law and res judicata; if such a servitude is no longer legally
possible, the factory would not be in a position to repurchase it (and might be enti-
tled to compensation for losing it).
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to the extent that categories of confiscatory nontakings are recog-
nized.  Recognizing a fourth category, the “reverse payment zone,”
offers further opportunities for limiting any judicial takings doctrine.
Shrinking the class of potential challenges could make the doctrine
more a curiosity than a threat to states’ authority to determine their
own property law.  Nearly null is not the same as null, however, and
the many questions that have been raised about judicial takings—pro-
cedural, remedial, conceptual—would continue to trouble courts and
engage commentators.  Although I cannot delve into all of these
issues here, it is appropriate to follow up the discussion of limits with
some brief comments about how courts may nonetheless land in the
pay zone, and what can be done about it.
1. What’s Left?
My goal in this essay has been to isolate questions rather than
provide answers, but readers will understandably wonder what
remains in the category of judicial takings after all the limits above are
applied.  It cannot just be limits all the way down.  Other judicial tak-
ings scholarship has articulated underlying visions of property that
either cabin what courts can ultimately do,159 or, alternatively, suggest
that certain restrictions are anathema.160  Another possibility is an
expectations-based approach that might assess how drastic or surpris-
ing are particular judicial changes, although it cannot be expectations
all the way down, either.161
A different way to pour content into the judicial-takings doctrine
would focus on instances in which the court’s decision works a trans-
formation of an owner’s discrete property interest through aggrega-
tion.  While regulatory takings analysis to date has focused primarily
on what has been taken and much less on what has been done with
it,162 political branch takings are almost invariably associated with
reconfiguring sets of rights into larger and more valuable configura-
159 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights Under the Takings Doctrine: The Clash
Between the Ius Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 37 (2011).
160 See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Stop the Stop the Beach Plurality!, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619
(2011).
161 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1538–41; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at R
1110 (noting “the seemingly patent circularity of a court’s distinguishing among prop-
erty rights on the basis of reasonable expectations about their continuation”).
162 A notable exception is Rubenfeld, supra note 21. R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 54  7-JAN-13 9:10
110 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
tions.  Eminent domain can generate an assembly surplus163 explicitly
by combining parcels of land.  In the regulatory arena, different kinds
of regulatory assemblages can be achieved, like getting everyone in
the neighborhood access to cable television or saving an ecologically
sensitive area.  Because (legitimate) nonjudicial takings are invariably
in service of some larger goal, that part of the story rarely receives
attention.  Instead, attention turns to other matters, such as whether
the thing taken represents a “discrete twig” that would be both easy to
settle over and especially demoralizing for the owner to lose.164
Most adjudicated property disputes do involve a “discrete twig”
(some particular disputed property interest), but the question is usu-
ally just “who owns the twig?”  Either way the case goes, it will remain a
twig.  Assembly of many twigs to achieve a larger goal is rarer in the
judicial context.  When it occurs, it is more likely to generate sur-
pluses like those that political actors generate through their regula-
tory acts than is a decision that awards a twig to A over B in the course
of resolving a dispute.165  On this account, a court that establishes a
new easement across the property of many landowners to allow pas-
sage of large numbers of people would be doing something considera-
bly different than a court that finds party A has an easement across
the land of party B solely in order to access B’s own land.  The reason
is not that “the public” or “the government” is involved in the first
163 There could also be disassembly surplus if gains were achieved by dividing
property among many owners. Cf. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)
(approving the exercise of eminent domain to break up a land oligopoly).
164 Michelman, supra note 131, at 1233 (illustrating the idea of “some distinctly R
perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation” by describing the right
to continue an existing use as a “discrete twig”); id. at 1234 (setting out—and sug-
gesting some uncertainty about—the assumptions required to reach the textual con-
clusion, notably “that deprivation of one of these mentally circumscribed things is an
event attended by pain of a specially acute or demoralizing kind, as compared with
what one experiences in response to the different kind of event consisting of a gen-
eral decline in one’s net worth”).  This idea of discrete investment-backed expecta-
tions forms part of the Penn Central test for regulatory takings that was reiterated in
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 554 U.S. 528 (2005). See supra note 24 and accompany- R
ing text.
165 This distinction resembles, in some respects, Joseph Sax’s distinction “between
the role of government as participant and the government as mediator in the process
of competition among economic claims.”  Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36, 62 (1965). See also Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes
and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5–6 (distinguishing an interme-
diate type of property disruption that is bound up with social transition from lower-
level “housekeeping” disruptions and from larger-scale expropriations that are based
on denials of membership within a community).
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case.166  Although often there may be correlations along those lines, a
court might also assemble a set of easements for the benefit of
residents of a private neighborhood or students of a private university.
Treating such aggregative decisions as more likely candidates for
judicial takings analysis dovetails with the twin goals of allowing courts
to carry out their ordinary business without interference, while still
keeping them from undertaking acts that, if undertaken by a political
actor, would count as takings.  And it fits with the account of institu-
tional competence that has been developed in this essay.  Coupled
with the limits that have been identified, judicial takings might be
identified with a surplus-generating reconfiguration of property rights
that is accomplished independent of background principles and not
as a function of common law evolution,  without any rationale that
would make it into a compensatory nontaking, and in a setting where
the need for aggregation makes a reverse payment option infeasible.
A rare animal indeed, but one we cannot rule out as a theoretical
possibility.
2. Remedies for the Purseless
If a judicial taking were found, the purseless court would not be
able to make the taking good retroactively by paying for it, although
the legislature could step in to do so.  With invalidation (or the appli-
cation of a Rule 4 alternative) standing as the only institutionally
appropriate responses, a lingering question involves the interim
period between the initial decision that amounted to a taking and the
invalidation or modification of that decision. First English makes the
interim period a compensable taking even if the act in question is
abandoned after it is adjudged to be a taking.  An initial question is
whether First English should even apply in the judicial context.
Despite the Stop the Beach plurality’s insistence that the identity of the
governmental actor does not matter, the First English remedy may
address a problem that is not implicated in the judicial context: that
an actor could engage in a series of regulatory takings with impunity
by simply dropping or amending a given regulation upon losing a
challenge.167  The reasoning here is similar to that raised above;
166 See Barros, supra note 2, at 906–09 (suggesting a distinction based on party R
identity).
167 Justice Brennan raises this concern pointedly in his dissent in San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego when he quotes from remarks prepared by a California
City Attorney for a National Institute of Municipal Law Officers conference in Califor-
nia:  “IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND START
OVER AGAIN.”  450 U.S. 621, 655 n.22 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
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courts are generally thought to lack the incentives that political actors
arguably have to substitute unpaid inputs for paid ones in achieving
public ends.
If First English applies, however, we are faced with the specter of a
constitutional wrong—the interim taking—without a remedy.  What
to do, then, about a governmental actor that has a duty to pay but no
means to pay?  In private law contexts, the problem of judgment-proof
defendants can be addressed by requiring those engaging in conduct
that may create liability to carry insurance or post bonds.  Judicial tak-
ings insurance, perhaps funded by court fees, is not an institutional
impossibility.  But it would send an odd signal and could introduce
moral hazard concerns by making property owners less prone to pur-
sue takings claims promptly.168  And it may be unnecessary.
Judicial decisions differ from other governmental actions in that
they have identifiable winners and losers listed right in the case cap-
tion, whose resources are reachable through standard procedural
means.169  Thus, it could well be workable to have the party who gains
by (what turns out to be) a taking compensate the takee for the
interim loss.170  The famously passive-voiced Takings Clause does not
James Longtin, Avoiding and Defending Constitutional Attacks on Land Use Regulations
(Including Inverse Condemnation), in 38B NIMLO MUNICIPAL L. REV. 192–93 (1975)).
168 Cf. Pen˜alver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 337–39 (raising concerns that liti- R
gants would underinvest in advocacy, to the detriment of property law, if compensa-
tion were available for certain kinds of judicially-produced deprivations).  The just
compensation requirement already operates as insurance, as has been well noted, and
moral hazard concerns have been raised in other takings contexts. See, e.g., Fischel &
Shapiro, supra note 149; Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Com-
pensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984); see also ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 81, R
at 152–53 (discussing and collecting sources on the moral hazard problem associated
with compensation).
169 To be sure, neither the win nor the loss may be in cash.  But whatever just
compensation bill may be accruing in the judicial takings context corresponds to a
benefit someone is receiving.
170 Pen˜alver and Strahilevitz similarly observe that a private party, rather than the
government, might be the “most appropriate defendant” in a takings case.  Pen˜alver
& Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 340 n.126 (suggesting that where private party Paul R
wins property rights formerly held by private party Peter, and redistribution between
the two is not the goal, “imposing liability on the State . . . makes less sense than
drawing on Paul’s resources to make Peter whole”).  The procedure described in the
text would do just that.  As Pen˜alver & Strahilevitz note, this point relates to scholar-
ship on “givings”—the always-present flip-side of takings. Id.; see also RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 4–5 (1993); WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS (Donald
G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001).  While usually benefits are not charged against the
recipients, things look quite different when the recipient is a single, identifiable pri-
vate party who has come looking for this benefit through a lawsuit.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 57  7-JAN-13 9:10
2012] picturing  takings 113
specify who must provide just compensation.  At least in simple cases
with private parties on both sides, ensuring compensation could be as
simple as adapting familiar procedural tools like stays of judgment
and supersedeas bonds.171  I have just suggested that simple cases of
this sort are not the likeliest candidates for judicial takings, but if a
different vision of judicial takings carries the day, such mechanisms
could become important.
Suppose a property case involving an easement is resolved in
favor of Winner and against Loser, with the result that Loser can no
longer keep Winner from crossing her land.  If Loser can make out a
plausible takings claim, then she could get a stay of the judgment until
the takings claim is resolved, subject to any bonding requirements
that may be necessary to protect Winner.172  Winner might then be
given the opportunity to get immediate enforcement of the judgment
by posting a bond that ensures he (Winner) would be able to pay just
compensation for the property in the event it is found to be a taking.
The details of this procedure could be constructed to promote the
prompt and diligent pursuit of takings claims.173  By letting Loser
avoid the possibility of an uncompensated temporary taking and mak-
ing Winner liable for any taking that in fact results, it would address
the “wrong without a remedy” concerns associated with judicial tak-
ings.  It would also remove any concern that Winner and Loser would
collude in the initial property case, with Loser agreeing to take the
loss and later seek compensation from the State.174
Admittedly, the procedure would not work well in cases where a
large and diffuse public stands on one side and a small and cohesive
set of property owners stands on the other.  The ability for the public
to come up with a bond may be limited by free rider problems and
ordinary transaction costs.  An impediment likewise exists where one
party simply lacks money.  If the party challenging the taking cannot
post a bond, it risks suffering an uncompensated loss if the decision is
171 See FED. R. CIV. P. 62.
172 Standards for issuing such a stay might take into account a number of factors,
including probability of success on the merits.
173 For example, the amount of the initial bond would be keyed to the length of
suspension, which would in turn be keyed to the expected amount of time to dili-
gently pursue a takings claim to resolution.
174 See Pen˜alver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 339–41 (outlining the potential for R
collusion where compensation for a taking is available).  It is questionable whether
collusion presents a significant worry in this context, much less one of sufficient uni-
queness, insolubility, and magnitude to drive doctrine, but the approach in the text
would alleviate such concerns, to the extent they exist.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 58  7-JAN-13 9:10
114 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
ultimately found to be a taking.175  Nor would off-the-rack stay or
bonding approaches deal well with the claims of property owners who
are affected by the court’s judgment but who are not parties to the
initial lawsuit.176  Courts might, however, find ways to adapt existing
procedural tools to try to address such cases.  Alternatively, the legisla-
ture could endorse a given judicial decision, putting itself on the hook
for the potential interim payments, or, alternatively, override it.  If a
further check were needed, a remedy for a judicial breach of the Just
Compensation Clause could be a judicial bonding or insurance
requirement, as discussed above.  My point in raising these possibili-
ties is not to advocate for any particular model, but rather to show that
there may well be ways for courts to satisfy the dictates of the pay zone
on the rare instances their actions place them there.
CONCLUSION
The current spotlight on judicial takings reveals conceptual ambi-
guities in takings law as a whole, and offers an opportunity for reexam-
ining the relationships among different parts of the doctrinal
framework.  This essay has tried to distill a coherent picture from what
is, at best, an untidy set of doctrines.  The exercise has involved some
potentially controversial gap filling and reasoning by extension, as
well as some departures from established doctrine.  Nonetheless, by
mapping out one view of the takings terrain, I hope to have both
nailed down points of consensus and isolated remaining disagree-
ments and ambiguities in a way that will advance efforts to understand
and contribute to takings doctrine.
175 We would need to know more about the ability of such parties to receive sup-
port from others interested in the case’s outcome who will enjoy positive spillovers if
it goes in the challenger’s favor.
176 See Barros, supra note 2, at 909 (distinguishing this factual scenario from a case R
brought by parties to the state court litigation in which the judicial taking allegedly
occurred); Bloom & Serkin, supra note 113, at 593–95 (discussing some complexities R
surrounding claims by those who were not parties to the original case).
